Absolute Consciousness

I want to examine Sartre’s argument for a new view of consciousness based on his study of phenomenology. Next, I want to discuss Sartre’s philosophical object of attack, and what advantage there is for a new position concerning a theory of consciousness. Why did Sartre believe that it was so important that consciousness be re-examined? Sartre’s study of consciousness, Transcendence of the Ego ,(1934) should not just be understood as a polemic against other theories of consciousness, but in light of Sartre’s later philosophical examination of human existence, Being and Nothingness,(1943). And I am always on the look out for a Theory of Spiritual Experience!

Without the “I,” consciousness is absolute. French phenomenological existentialist Jean-Paul Sartre reasoned consciousness is consciousness of itself. Consciousness is translucence and all objects are before it, making consciousness “positional” (asserting the existence of its object) when conscious of any object. However, when consciousness is conscious of itself, it is “non-positional” since consciousness cannot be an object for itself. Therefore, according to Sartre, absolute consciousness is “un-reflected consciousness,” and has no object for itself. A pure consciousness --having no object presenting --is consciousness of itself.

What is the character of this “consciousness of consciousness?” Sartre reminds us that some philosophers in the past, like Spinoza and Descartes, were eager to present “knowledge” as the primary attribute of consciousness so that consciousness meant “ a knowledge of knowledge.” So for these thinkers, consciousness is knowledge--there is only the known and knower.

The knower-known dyads are inadequate terms for understanding consciousness. Implicit to this idea of consciousness of an object is the idea of a consciousness, which is conscious of itself as a consciousness. One can be conscious of being conscious of a table, for example. However, we are faced with a problem because a third term, or observer, is needed in order for the knower to become known. We can have, for example, the observer of the table conscious of the table, and he can be conscious of being conscious of the table, and he can be conscious of being conscious of being conscious of the table—or “the known, the knower known, the knower known to the knower”….ad infinitum.

What is Sartre’s solution for correcting this knower-known definition of  “consciousness of consciousness?” We must stop at a “final term” or continue in an infinite regression of the knower-know series. This final term is a non-self conscious reflection, or a non-cognitive relation of the self to itself. It is a consciousness without the “me,” or “I.” So for Sartre, behind all positional consciousness that reflects on some object, there is a non-positional consciousness which has no concept of “I.” Only after perception, can one look back and reflect on the “I” which viewed the table. Sartre illustrates how the “I” disappears and re-appears in his famous streetcar example.

“When I run after a streetcar, when I look at the time, when I am absorbed in looking at a portrait, no “I” is present. There is a consciousness of the streetcar-having-to-be-caught, etc., and non-positional consciousness of that consciousness. On these occasions, I am immersed in the world of objects; they constitute the unity of my consciousness; they present themselves with values; with qualities that attract or repel—but I have disappeared. I am nothing. There is no place for Me at this level of consciousness. This is not accidental, it is not due to a temporary lapse of attention, but to the structure of consciousness itself”(The Transcendence of the Ego, pp. 49.).

This non-positional consciousness, or non-reflective consciousness is a pre-reflective cogito, or an absolute consciousness underlying the Cartesian “I think; therefore, I am,” cogito.

Examining "The Sartrean Critique of Consciousness" for a Theory of Spiritual Experience.

“…it would be an infinitely contracted me.”--Jean-Paul Sartre

What would happen if we allowed this constructed “I” to be smuggled into consciousness? Sartre warns this constructed “I” would “tear” consciousness from itself, and obscure, or becloud the lucidity, and crystallinity of consciousness. This “I” before consciousness is a foreign body, or element contained within the glasslike structure of consciousness. Sartre tells us “It, the ‘I,’ would be to the concrete and psychophysical me what a point is to three dimensions; it would be an infinitely contracted me.” If one solidifies consciousness, then it becomes a concrete mass and loses its self-movement, self-activity, and spontaneity. Consciousness becomes a “monad” from the Greek work “μονάς” meaning single, or unit.

This is one instance that Sartre gives a good reason for his new theory of consciousness. Sartre speaks of the “vertigo of consciousness,“ that is, the essence of consciousness is possibility. Also, the spontaneity of consciousness and its ability to choose projects-- an imagined goal--are the other important themes that lead to Sartre’s main theme of “Freedom.” This, I believe, is Sartre’s ulterior motive for writing, Transcendence of the Ego. Sartre is constructing a theoretical foundation for his theme of “Freedom” by eradicating the “infinitely contracted me” and replacing it with a self-moving, self-active, free consciousness.

The concept of nothingness is applied here to describe consciousness; however, there is a correlative concept that must be explained in connection with consciousness as nothingness—Bad Faith.

Sartre applies this concept of Bad Faith in at least two different ways: first, there is bad faith as play-acting. Again we have the imaginary café environment, but this time the bad faith example is a waiter who absorbs himself in the role of the waiter so as to escape making choices as a free and autonomous human agent. The demands placed upon him are those of a waiter, not the demands of a free human being; he pretends that he is bound by necessity—to earn a wage—but in reality it is a necessity that is self-imposed.

Sartre has a second twist to the concept of bad faith in which the self views itself as only a determinate object. In order to escape making existential choices, the Subject will postulate itself as a “thing” wholly subordinated to physical causation—no freedom of will-- as a justification to escape responsibility from Freedom itself--from living an authentic life of choice.  This form of consciousness understands human behavior as only a matter of physical forces that determine action just as a machine, or a leaf is blown in the wind.  (Existentialism, Mary Warnock, New York : Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 102-103.).

To have consciousness as an object—as an Ego—is only a step away from bad faith. To view consciousness as reflected consciousness would negate consciousness of its plasticity. Sartre views consciousness as “unreflected consciousness.”

“This cogito is performed by a consciousness which is oriented toward a consciousness by a consciousness which takes consciousness as an object. It must be understood that the certitude of the cogito is absolute, for (as Husserl states) there is an indissoluble unity of the reflecting consciousness and the consciousness reflected upon, to the extent without the reflecting consciousness could not exist without the reflected consciousness”(Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, trans. F. Williams and R. Kirkpatrick, New York: Noonday Press, 1959, pp. 44).

In the beginning of Being and Nothingness, the first subject treated by Sartre is phenomenon. But in his study of phenomenon and Being, Sartre is soon led to that which phenomena presents themselves—that is to say, consciousness. Therefore, it is necessary to analyze with great care the whole concept of consciousness and its structure. Sartre puts forth some unique points of view which require careful attention in regard to how consciousness has been conceived of in the past and contrasted with the Sartrean concept of consciousness.

Sartre presents his analysis of consciousness in the form of a rebellion against psychologists and philosophers who view consciousness, or in these person’s terms—the “Ego,” as a material present in consciousness. For Sartre, consciousness and ego are not the same.  Indeed Sartre’s presentation is within the historical existential tradition. It has been said that Existentialism is not a disciplined philosophical system, but a general label for rebellions in various forms against traditional philosophy.

At this point, one should point out a shortcoming of Sartre’s essay in The Transcendence of the Ego. First, Sartre never gives the reader a clear view of his object of attack. He may have classified his target for reform in some other philosophical work but in The Transcendence of the Ego, he is vague on exactly what theory of consciousness is under attack. Sartre only quotes a few statements from Kant, Spinoza, and Descartes, then one is left with the task of piecing together the opposing view purely from Sartre’s new theory of consciousness. Sartre begins with one of the “classical views” of the “I” without giving any reasons why one should begin with Kant rather than Spinoza, or Spinoza before Descartes. One is purely at Sartre’s mercy on which direction one should go in this subject.

Without this unity of consciousness, or the unity of apperception in which the “I think” must accompany any sensuous representation, no object could be intuited. This means that the problem of consciousness is one of logical validity—a problem of Critical Philosophy and not a question about ontology. This is a question of “fact” for Sartre:

”Consequently, “to make into a reality” the transcendental ‘I,’ to make of it the inseparable companion of each of our ‘consciousnesses,’ is to pass on ‘fact,’ not on validity, and to take a point of view radically different form that of Kant” (Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 33).

 
Kant, according to Sartre, has been misinterpreted, or at least Kant’s theory has been applied in such a way as to obscure the original task of phenomenology scientifically investigating the structure of consciousness. Sartre properly asks the fundamental question of Critical Philosophy, “Is the ‘I’ that we encounter in our representations, or is it the ‘I’ which in fact unites the representations to each other?” (Jean-Paul Sartre, The Transcendence of the Ego, p. 34).

Sartre’s critique perceptively cites those moments of awareness without the presence of “I” in his streetcar example. Sartre believed that Husserl’s phenomenology is able to solve many problems of Kant’s view of the “I,” or the relationship of the “I” to consciousness.

What is Kant’s, or for that matter, the classical view concerning the presence of a transcendental “I”? The “I,” or “ego” is viewed as a substance, or point suspended within consciousness which radiates attention out into its field of perception. The “I” is a solid center perceiving phenomenon. They would consider the transcendental “I” as a need, or a theoretical requirement of consciousness because consciousness must have a nucleus, or core in which to unify itself and form a locality for its individuality. Also, the argument continues, the “I” provides a theoretically necessary reference point to which the self can refer its perceptions and thoughts. Thus, the “I” is an amalgamated base in which one’s consciousness is solidified. Therefore, we are all able to distinguish ourselves from one another; your consciousness, and my consciousness. Such is the classical view of the “I,” or “ego.”

Sartre’s phenomenological critique of consciousness takes us beyond this artificial solidified center of the “I” that provides unity and individuality for consciousness. Sartre adapts Husserl’s definition of consciousness to disclose to us why this constructed “I” is not the true self.  Husserl states that consciousness is consciousness of an object and is separate from that object. Further, all consciousness is consciousness of something and that consciousness has no content—it is a “nothingness” (no-thing-ness).

Sartre on Being and Nothingness

“Nothingness” is a central theme in Being and Nothingness, and its basic meaning is partly derived from Heidegger’s use of the word. The concept is partly derived because there are four ways in which Sartre uses this word--two of which are borrowed from Heidegger’s philosophy.

For Heidegger, nothingness described a kind of metaphysical distance that separates human existence and the world; more correctly, it is the gap between a person’s consciousness and objects in which they appear, or thrown before him. 1.) Nothingness in this sense is epistemological. Secondly, Heidegger uses nothingness in another way: as 2.) the “futility,” or the vanishing and passing away of objects. This second sense is very important because this is the foundation of the Heideggerian “angst” which transforms Human Being (da-sein, Heidegger would say this characterization is an over simplification) from an inauthentic existence to an authentic one. “Nothingness” in this sense is emotional.

Sartre accepts and employs this first meaning of nothingness as epistemology—the metaphysical gap. However, Sartre then takes this concept of nothingness and connects it with 3.) “negation.” Sartre tells the story of Pierre being absent from a café—waiting for someone absent is an experienced negation. Here, Sartre is trying to show that nothingness can enter our experience of the world. Sartre is an extreme empiricist and even describes to us the experience of nothingness.

Lastly, Sartre again modifies the concept of nothingness in a special sense which is important to our search for a theory of spiritual experience. Nothingness in this last sense describes the Being-for-itself; it is the emptiness of consciousness which one attempts to give substance by action, thinking, and perceptions of the work. 4.) Nothingness is for Sartre “potentiality” that must be actualized, or made real, by choice. Nothingness is both an external and internal phenomenon for Sartre (Existentialism, Mary Warnock, New York : Oxford University Press, 1970, pp. 93-95)

Sartre believes philosophy should expel these “things” from consciousness and reveal its real connection with the world. An object, a table for example, is not in consciousness, but rather the table is in space. Consciousness is a positional consciousness of the world, and this positional consciousness transcends itself in order to reach an object. Thus, consciousness is “intention” (from Husserl’s theory of Intentionality) directed toward the world, toward the table, for example, and as intention is directed to the table, it is absorbed in it. Not only is the table “out there,” but also so is the ego, or “I,” which is also an object among many objects. This is what Sartre means by saying that consciousness has no content. Consciousness is only intentionality toward objects. Therefore, the ego, ideas, phenomena, and thoughts are not contained in consciousness, but are objects for consciousness. Sartre expresses this emptiness of consciousness as a “wind blowing toward objects.” It is total emptiness because all the world is outside of it.

Sartre’s Relocation of the Ego

We can see Sartre doing something extraordinary. Sartre takes Husserl’s theory of intentionality to reject, or eradicate the “I” from consciousness. Sartre performs a sort of theoretical house cleaning by situating the “I” outside of consciousness. However, one may ask why? Strangely, Sartre gives few reasons why the “I” must be located outside of consciousness; however, one thing is certain by viewing consciousness as emptiness, or “a wind blowing toward objects,” Sartre is able to lay the foundation for later analysis of Human existence (Being-for-itself). One can understand this more clearly by reading Being and Nothingness, which centers on this understanding of consciousness.

Because consciousness is empty, we are able to understand Sartre when he says that consciousness is consciousness through and through. Consciousness can only be limited by itself. Sartre also says that the existence of consciousness comes from consciousness itself and that consciousness refers perpetually to itself.

Sartre sees in this clear and lucid consciousness both unity and individuality without the need for this extraneous “I” to be interjected into pure consciousness. Sartre thinks that consciousness unifies itself by escaping from itself to an object of attention which is transcendent to consciousness, but it is within this object of attention that consciousness is unified. Because consciousness can be limited only by itself, the individuality of consciousness is from the very nature of consciousness itself. Consequently, Sartre and his phenomenological concept of consciousness reject the “I” and its importance of providing unity and individuality to consciousness.  Sartre claims that the “I” is only an expression of unity and individuality of consciousness.