Postmodern Socrates on Virtue
“The fact is
that far from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue
is…Not only that, you may say also that, to the best of my belief, I have never
met anyone who did know.”—Socrates in Plato’s dialogue, Meno, (pdf.), para. 71
and 71c. “My advice to
you, if you will listen to it, is to be careful.”
—Anytus to Socrates, Meno, para. 94e.
Introduction:
Of all of the major areas of study in
philosophy--epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics (some would include the
history of philosophy)—ethics is by far the most difficult and complex to
analyze as ethical discourse incorporates historical beliefs,
metaphysical assumptions, and normative ethical rules (what
one ought to do). Notice that the word discourse has
already biased this introduction by focusing on the examination of moral
language such as the terms “good,” “better,” “obligation,” “wrong,” “right” and
“virtue.” Integration by individuals of different worldviews, cultural moral
concepts, and the rational justifications of moral actions make the use of
normative ethical terms the obvious area for the philosophy of language to
investigate with its applied methodology of logical analysis. There is an
apparent parallelism, which we will investigate, between ethics and
epistemology that is productive for clarifying ethical concepts until the meaning of
some key terms become obscure and even irresolvable as various logical analyses
inevitably separate into different seemingly contradictory camps of thought.
The motive and purpose of this essay is
to once again critique the
ubiquitous trope (meaning “twist”) of “postmodernism.”
Rhetorically, a trope is parasitical of some original meaning of a word, or
theme, which is then used in a different sense that further degrades into
a cliché like, for example, the “absent-minded
professor,” as a fictional story character. Postmodernism is a
collection of pre-selected philosophical disputes from the history of Western
philosophy that are reinterpreted as somehow “new,” and
representative of a contemporary existential threat to Western civilization organized
by conspiratorial homunculi allied with deviant minions such as leftists,
socialists, Marxists, dirty hippies, and romance novelist Jane Austen who
understands “the virtues is a certain kind of marriage and indeed a
certain kind of naval officer (that is, a certain kind
of English naval officer)(AV., p. 186)” to promote a false
ideology that denies the existence of all virtue, truth, and knowledge (Postmodernism and
Faith, video).
During the last few years a number of
persons have recommended that I read Dr. Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on ethics
entitled, “After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory,”(1981)(pdf.)(Abbreviated
as AV). I chose to critique this particular book since Dr. MacIntyre can
actually formulate arguments of his critique of postmodernism unlike those
embarrassing self-described postmodern critics hanging around the Internet.
MacIntyre published in his early career many academic articles on Marxism (MacIntyre
bibliography) so he is sui generis, in a category
of his own, separate from the media’s fast-talking former Marxists who couldn’t
tell the difference between Karl Marx, and Carl B. Marks. He authored After
Virtue at about the same time Neoliberalism swept over the Untied
States in the form of Reagan’s cultural revolution of 1981: a Great March
forward into despotism. MacIntyre used the term “postmodernist,” only once in “After-Virtue,(AV.,
p. XII) along with other terms such as “Enlightenment project,” (Ibid.,
p. 36), “post-Enlightenment culture,” (Ibid., p. 113), “modern
culture,” “modern age,” and “modernity.” In another
book, “Whose Justice? Which Rationality?” (1988 )(pdf.)(WJWR),
MacIntyre continues his extended argument with “post-Enlightenment culture,”
(WJWR, p. 6) “postmodern relativists,” (Ibid., p. 353),
and “postmodernist radicals, (Ibid., p. 387). All of these
terms have the same meaning and are used interchangeably by postmodern critics.
In the prologue of the third edition
of After Virtue (2007) titled, “After Virtue after
a Quarter of a Century,” MacIntyre writes of his personal beliefs [My
bracket]: "When I wrote After Virtue, I was already an
Aristotelian, but not yet a Thomist, something made plain in my account of
Aquinas at the end of chapter 13 [Medieval Aspects and Occasions]. I became a
Thomist after writing After Virtue in part because I became
convinced that Aquinas was in some respects a better Aristotelian than
Aristotle, that not only was he an excellent interpreter of Aristotle's texts,
but that he had been able to extend and deepen both Aristotle’s metaphysical
and his moral enquiries (p. X)."
MacIntyre’s stated philosophical
worldview can be accurately described as Aristotelian-Thomist Realism: “MacIntyre
defends Thomistic realism as rational enquiry directed to the discovery of
truth (IEP: MacIntyre).”
I did not choose MacIntyre’s book for this critical essay because of any
Catholic belief he may, or may not have. There are a number of Catholic based ethical
philosophies that are admirable such as the Trappist Monk Thomas Merton advocated,
but was murdered after he gave an anti-war speech in 1968 against the Vietnam
War at the International Asiatic Conference in Thailand. Also, Pope John Paul II studied
Phenomenologist, Max Scheler, and advocates a very interesting version of phenomenological
Thomism resulting in the Pope’s dissertation titled "Reevaluation
of the possibility of founding a Catholic ethic on the ethical system of Max
Scheler.” Dorothy Day represents
another case in which this religious tradition is recognized as consistent with
labor activism that values human beings, and inspired her to help create
the Catholic Worker Movement.
The Church awarded the title “Servant of God“ to Day and was positively
mentioned by the very popular Pope Francis in 2015. My focus of concern here is
not Catholicism, but rather the philosophical incoherence of the postmodern
trope I have described.
Dr. MacIntyre is difficult to critique
for three reasons. First, he has authored a massive number of books and
articles during his lifetime. Since I have only one lifetime, and unable to
read all of his writings, I will have to be satisfied with a parity
check for possible incoherence of his relevant views on virtue. After
Virtue conceptually contains in substance many of his most important
philosophical writings, and themes. For example, his journal article, “Epistemological
Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,” (1977)(pdf.)(abbreviation,
EC) is recapitulated
in “After Virtue: Chapter Seven: 'Fact', Explanation and Expertise.”
Secondly, MacIntyre is a masterful
rhetorician and his writing is among the best a person can read in the English
language. His training in Aristotelian philosophy shows through his artfully
crafted written words and arguments: each sentence is packed with meaning in a
complex chain of other arguments that make it a challenge to construct clear
and concise corresponding counter-arguments. This highly intelligent
philosopher is also a skillful escape artist who is difficult to pin down on
some points as he anticipates potential criticism while moving strategically in
and around the complicated passages of Aristotle’s taxonomy of virtue. After-Virtue is
complex as MacIntyre dives into ancient philosophy, Western Medieval thought,
and modern British analytic language philosophy.
Lastly, MacIntyre’s After
Virtue is difficult to critique because there are certain argument
threads that I agree with, but which are entangled with other postmodern
critiques that I found logically problematic. Some of the topics that I thought
were very good and learned from are the following: his very short summary of
Kierkegaard is very good short summary (AV., p. 39); his critique of
modern social sciences and modern inductive methodologies (Ibid.,
p. 88 ); Homer’s heroic poetry of the Iliad and Socrates on
Homeric ethics (Ibid., p. 121, 131); the Virtues of
Athens chapter gave criticism of ideological individualism and
emphasized the need for friendship and community instead of promoting Pleonexia,
or excessive greed, and acquisitiveness (Ibid., p. 137, 208, 214,
227); the importance of Narrative for social life (Ibid.,
p. 137, 227); dominance of the modern bureaucratic manager model with a
critique of work in modern society (Ibid., p. 228 );
examined Phronesis, or the ability to exercise good intellectual
judgment as a virtue (Ibid., p. 154); criticism of imperialism,
or original acquisition (Ibid., p.251). I generally accept
MacIntyre’s expertise in After-Virtue regarding the doctrines
Aristotelian and Thomistic.
There are some problematic issues with
weaving a critique of postmodernism into this study of virtue, but I want to be
open about the criteria used in formulating my criticisms of the many complex
arguments MacIntyre presents so that my reasoning can be followed. I am keeping
in mind three philosophers as my philosophical touchstones: Logician Ludwig
Wittgenstein (mostly his later thought), Transcendental Kantian criticism, and
existentialist Soren Kierkegaard.
Wittgenstein studied both Kant and Kierkegaard very closely, and deeply
influenced his study of philosophy.
Within this essay are four major
counter-arguments directed toward MacIntyre’s definition and criticisms of
postmodernism:
- If consistently
applied, MacIntyre’s view of postmodernism defines the premodern philosopher,
Socrates, as postmodern.
- MacIntyre as
an Aristotelian-Thomist Realist contradictorily embraces Anti-realist
epistemology.
- MacIntyre leaves
the door open for Relativistic Historicism while
advocating a particular tradition of ethical thought.
- MacIntyre’s
viewpoint is subject to Ethical Skepticism compounded
by 2 and 3.
First Counter-argument: “Postmodern” Socrates
“In my opinion you are well advised not to leave
Athens and live abroad. If you behaved like this as a foreigner in another
country, you would most likely be arrested as a wizard.”—Meno to Socrates, 80b.
I.F. Stone directs our
attention to the word “wizard,” or "γόης" (goes) that Meno used to describe Socrates as “one who howls
out enchantments, a sorcerer,” and
metaphorically a “juggler”, or “cheat,” and “imposter” (I.F.
Stone, “The Trial of Socrates,”(1988 ), Little, Brown & Co., Boston, p.
59). Western philosophical literature on ethics is at least as old as the Epic of
Gilgamesh, an ancient epic poem authored about 3000 BC. The ideal
arena for our purposes of discussion is Plato’s famous dialogue, the Meno,
since it contains fundamental problems of ethics that can bring together the
thoughts of philosophers such as MacIntyre, G.E. Moore, Kierkegaard,
and Wittgenstein for examination.
My guiding touchstones for reading After Virtue are
interestingly related. For MacIntyre, English philosopher G.E. Moore is exhibit
“A” of the folly of postmodernism, while Kierkegaard’s corpse is presented as
exhibit “B” of the ravages of modernist disease. MacIntyre does not mention
Wittgenstein in After Virtue, but Wittgenstein and G.E. Moore were both
contemporary professors at Trinity College, Cambridge along with Bertrand
Russell. G.E. Moore, who was at one time president of the Aristotelian Society
at Cambridge, is recognized as one of the early founders of analytic language
philosophy. The School of Logical Positivism known as the “Vienna Circle” (1924) was
founded in the name of Wittgenstein for his philosophical work, “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (1921)(pdf.), before he was discovered by the
positivists to be a radical mystic. Although Wittgenstein did not have a high
regard for Moore as a philosopher, he was influenced by Moore’s view on ethics,
which will be noted.
The Meno dialogue contains ethical problems by which
we can categorize various normative views on virtue in order to interpret their
ethical (what ought to be) and metaethical
(what is) standpoints; then, identify them by classificatory scheme as a cognitivist, noncognitivist,
naturalist, nonnaturalist, objectivist, non-objectivist, anti-realist and/or
realist. We will kindly consider objections to our Procrustean classifications,
which might be raised by passionate disciples that do not like being
pigeonholed. This approach provides a common referential framework to explore
these ever-elusive ethical dilemmas, and will strengthen all four objections
against MacIntyre’s criticisms of modernism.
A Very Short Background on the Socratic
Dialogue, Meno: “On Virtue”
MacIntyre
dates the Meno dialogue during Plato’s late period of authorship (WJWR,
p. 63). The Meno is a fictional dialogue written by Plato in 385
B.C. about real historical persons and events during 402 B.C. which is about three years before the trial
of Socrates. Ancient scholars later subtitled this dialogue as “On Virtue”
as a sequel to the Protagoras dialogue wherein Socrates claims that
virtue is knowledge; therefore, it must be something teachable (I.F. Stone,
p. 52-68 ). During this period Athens was just emerging from a terrible
dictatorship and civil war. Beginning back in 490 B.C. to 480 B.C. Athens and
Sparta had successfully combined forces to oppose and repel the Persian
invasion of Greece. However, later in 430 BC, Sparta declared war against it
former ally, Athens, for breaking a peace treaty and began a long series of
battles called the Peloponnesian
Wars. Also, this was the time that a reoccurring Typhus
plague begins in Athens that killed about 100,000 Athenians as Sparta laid
siege against the crowded fortified city. Finally, the Peloponnesian wars
between Athens and Sparta ended with the defeat of Athens at Aigospotamoi.
Years
later in 404 B.C. the “Rule
of the Thirty Tyrants” begins supported by Athenian oligarchs treasonously
allying themselves with Sparta. Just prior to the events in the dialogue Meno,
Spartan rulers were thinking about murdering all the Athenian men and
enslaving everyone else, but then on reflection thought it more profitable to
establish an oligarchy backed by the wealthy Athenian aristocracy of which
Socrates had some distance family relations. During the régime’s short eight
months reign, the Thirty were able to torture and execute without trial at
least 1500 Athenians thought to be democratic subversives, and hired 300 "lash-bearers"
to whip the Athenians to instill collective fear of the regime. Plato recounts
in the Apology dialogue how the Thirty ordered him and four men to
capture and execute an Athenian citizen named Leon of Salamis. Plato provides an interesting explanation
for the Thirty’s execution orders and why so many Greeks were executed: “…they
issued such instructions, their object being to implicate as many people as
possible in their crimes (32c-d).” This is a history Americans
should remember even today as right-wing fascists encourage election fraud and
violent insurrection. Socrates was also ordered by the Tyrants to commit the
same crime of execution as Plato was asked to do, but just laughed: both philosophers
refused to cooperate putting their lives in great danger.
And
then the tables turned. Belligerent former democratic forces of Athens in May
403 B.C. defeated the Thirty Tyrants and their military henchmen. The events in
the Meno occurred in “late January, or early February 402 B.C.
(IEP: Meno).” The atmosphere was
politically very tense while Athenian pro-democratic leaders were negotiating
with the oligarchs an amnesty for crimes committed during the former tyrannical
régime-- except for the Thirty themselves and about 3,000 officials who
were not to be spared punishment. Two of the Thirty were a cousin and uncle
related to Socrates. And then one last outrage committed by the oligarchs was
to massacre the people in the town of Eleusis, and then used the city as a base
from which followed yet another insurrectionist attack against Athens in 401
B.C. that brought about the Tyrant’s final defeat by Athens.
This is the history that Plato knows from
lived experience and set Socrates speaking to Meno, and the unhappy Anytus
about virtue. The formerly leading moderate demos politician, Anytus,
had to pay a bribe to the Thirty’s court that cost him all of his wealth as the
owner of a tannery (I.F, Stone, p. 174-180). While writing the Meno,
Plato knew that in 399 B.C. Socrates would be executed partly due to Anytus’
guilty vote at his trial. There are many stories of Anytus’ demise; they are
all contradictory, and none of them have happy endings. Plato also knew that
the mercenary soldier, Meno, was to join the soon defeated Persian army of
Cyrus who was attempting to overthrow his own brother, King Artaxerxes II.
Cyrus’ defeated enemy commanders were beheaded--except for Meno who was so
hated for his greed for wealth and power that he instead suffered prolonged
torture before finally being executed (IEP:Meno). I.F. Stone comments
that during early antiquity there was not a clear distinction between trade and
war (I.F.Stone, p. 26).
During
this setting of simmering civil war and gratuitous executions, Socrates appears
in Athens asking, “What is virtue?” I.F. Stone reminds us virtue, or “ἀρετή,”
(Arête) is derived from the name of the Greek god of war Ares, whose Roman name is Mars.
Virtue was believed to be goodness and excellence, which meant to
the Greeks “machismo, manliness, valor, and prowess.” “Virtue” is
from the Latin term “vitus” or “life”. If virtue were knowledge,
it would include the mercenary’s training in military weaponry and actual war
experience (Ibid., p. 52). Socrates noted that Cleophantes, the
son of the highly respected Athenian Themistocoles, “was well trained in
horsemanship that he could stand upright on a horseback and throw a javelin
from that position, and many other wonderful accomplishments the young man had,
for his father had him taught and made expert in every skill that a good
instructor could impart (Meno, 93d).”
The Poverty of Philosophy…of Ethics
“The fact is that far form knowing whether it can be
taught, I have no idea what virtue itself is. That is my own case. I share the
poverty of my fellow countrymen in this respect….”—Socrates in the Meno (71a).
Plato’s dialogues can be
read on multiple levels: the philosophical problems discussed; logical
structure; dialogue storyline narrative; the characters and their interactions
with other participants. One can read for Plato’s sarcastic humor, “But
look, Meno, here’s a piece of luck. Anytus has just sat down beside us (90a),”
or when Socrates complains of his bad memory (Meno, 70c, 76b) just
before introducing his Theory of Recollection. And interestingly, another level
of interpretation is Plato’s beliefs as compared to Socrates’ views on the
theme of each dialogue. This is especially difficult since there are no
surviving writings by Socrates except for student lecture notes; in addition,
it is especially difficult when the dialogue such as the Meno ends in no
firm conclusion about what virtue is. Socrates held to the theory knowledge as
remembrance, but Plato later seems to give it up. All students should remember
to take good notes!
Ancient
scholars have named the early Platonic dialogues as the Aporetic dialogues which
include the following works: Apology, Critias, Euthydemus, Euthyphro,
Gorgias, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Meno. There is debate on
some of the dialogue classifications as early. MacIntyre for example
places the Meno in the late period of authorship, while some
others place it in the early late period. The Greek term “ἀπορίᾳ”
when translated with reference to place means “difficulty of passing.”
“πορίᾳ”
without an alpha “ἀ” means a “pathway,”
but combined with the letter “ἀ” a
negative prefix (alpha
privative) changes
the meaning to “no pathway, or “no
way out.” However, when applied to persons, aporia means “poverty,”
and this is Socrates’ metaphor for the Athenians’ inability to define virtue (Meno,
71b). In the Meno, Plato makes use of a method of argument known as
the “Elenchus,” or ἔλεγξις
meaning, “refuting,’ or “reproving,” and is the Socratic method of deriving a
contradiction by having the speaker go through cross-examination and
argumentation to eventually agree with a conclusion that is directly opposite
to their originally held beliefs. Socrates does this multiple times in
discourse with Meno on virtue (73e, 78b, 80a).
Woke Socrates
“The unexamined life is not worth living.”-Socrates, Apology (38a)
This section will summarize the Meno (pdf. with
Stephanus pagination!) dialogue’s logical structure for later
argument analysis.
Meno begins asking if virtue can be
taught (70a). Socrates in turn asks Meno to define virtue, but Meno instead
gives a list of different kinds of virtues such as the good management of city
affairs; to help his friends and harm their foes; a woman’s obedience and
household management; and other virtues for children, old men, slaves, and
freemen (71e). Notice Meno’s list of virtues is about conduct.
Socrates objects to Meno’s attempt to simply list virtues, but instead he wants
the essence, or universal property of virtue, and not individual
virtues (72b). Socrates introduced the analogies of Bees (72b), shape (73e),
and color (74d) in asking Meno to not describe what bees, shapes, and colors
are in particular, but what is a bee in general, or what shape, or
color are in themselves. Socrates is focused on finding a definition of
virtue in ethical discourse.
Search for Essences
Within Husserlian phenomenology the
method for defining an essence is called Eidetic Reduction where
by a concept, or some experience, or a phenomenon is varied by observation,
and imagination to derive its universal property, or essence
in formulating a clear meaning. “Eidetic” is from Greek, εἶδος, (eidos), meaning
“that which is seen, form, shape, or figure.” Socrates refers
specifically to shape. Phenomenological reduction is
the method where by the phenomenologist strips away, or omits all
the accidental attributes of a phenomenon, and leaves only the necessary
attributes known as its “essence.” Words are essences, and
from them we formulate definitions. Phenomenology is the most
extreme version of empiricism, but even with this radical empiricism notice
that the “negative act” of “omission” of accidental
attributes is an indispensable step for determining essence. (Philosophy of
Symbolic Forms: Phenomenology of Knowledge, E. Cassirer, 1957, Vol. III, p.193)(pdf.).
Socrates questions Meno for another
definition that is singular and universal such as his friend Gorgias’ views on
virtue (73d). One quality, according to Gorgias, is the ability to govern men.
Socrates objects again arguing this definition should not apply to slaves, or a
child so both agree to add “justice as a virtue.” Socrates gives further
objections reminding Meno they are looking for the whole of
virtue, and not parts of virtue (73e). Meno’s next attempt defines virtue as
desiring fine things and being able to acquire them (77b). Socrates
seizes on the term “desire.” Meno believes men do desire evil things
(77c) even if it is evil, but then recants after Socrates convinces him that no
person desires evil since it brings injury and unhappiness to themselves (78b);
maybe not Socrates strongest argument. Socrates does not consider it to be
virtuous if someone acquires good things unjustly; rather, justice, temperance,
or piety, or some other attribute of virtue must be connected to acquisition if
we are to consider it virtuous (78e). But again Socrates reminds Meno they want
the whole of virtue, and agreed they cannot define it in terms of its parts! So
they must go back to the beginning of their inquiry (79c).
Geometry and Virtue
At this point the discussion turns to Meno’s dilemma of how could someone
recognize something unknown that is being sought after (80d). As a
phenomenological experiment Socrates asks a slave a series of
simple geometry questions to demonstrate innate, or a prior knowledge
(82a-86a). Notice Socrates’ theory of innate knowledge is based on the
subjective experience of calculative thinking in making an inference to
a conclusion that is phenomenologically similar to the subjective experience
of remembering. Later on we will see how the phenomenological method
of description is important to G.E. Moore’s analysis of ethical discourse and
is completely missed by his critics—including Wittgenstein. Socrates’
experiment is also making a comparison between answering geometric questions
and seeking answers about virtue. Unlike the confused Meno and Anytus, the
slave is much more successful answering Socrates’ geometry questions.
Socrates will return to Meno’s dilemma
later in the dialogue, but now he wants to explore the hypothesis of what
attribute of the soul must exist if it can be taught (87b). Virtue is good and
so it is also advantageous (87e) unlike the attributes of health, strength,
good looks, or wealth that could do us harm if not used wisely. When guided by
wisdom—not ignorance—the advantages of courage, temperance, wit, and memory
will bring happiness (88c). Consequently, virtue must be some kind of knowing
and not by some innate nature (89a). Socrates proposes a
second hypothesis: if something were teachable, there would be teachers and
students (89d). However, Socrates says he has not found any teachers of
virtue (89d).
A Bad Case of Homunculus Anytus-itis
The financially bankrupted Anytus joins
the discussion with Socrates and is asked if he found any teachers of virtue
like, for example, the sophist (89e) to which Anytus strongly rejects declaring
he would have nothing to do with such folks since any Athenian gentleman is a
better man than any of them (91c). Anytus believed that a group of foreigners
and other undesirables were under-minding the Athenian polis by
questioning its tradition of virtue ethics, and Greek divinities (atheism).
Socrates responds that one can be a good man and not a good teacher of virtue;
take for example, the sons of some of the best men of Athens. If virtue could
be taught, they would have passed it to their children. This comment angers
Anytus thinking that Socrates is referring to him and his friends: "I
think, Socrates, that you readily speak ill of men. I would advise you, if you
are willing to listen to me, to be discreet. As is probably the case in other
cities, it is easier to do men harm than good, and certainly in this one. But I
think you already know that (94e)." Socrates continues his
argument: if there are no teachers, there can be no students (96b).
Socratic Aporia
Socrates now answers Meno’s dilemma of
trying to identify something, such as virtue, that seems to have no agreed
definition. Socrates claims knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly is not
the only source of virtue; true opinion could also lead to
virtue just as a person who never traveled the road to Larissa could guide
others just as well an experienced guide with knowledge. Meno counters that
true opinion is not certain for making judgments. Socrates responds that true
opinion must be “tied down” by reason to determine if an opinion is
true. In this particular dialogue knowledge is a justified true belief that
separates it from true opinion, and that an inexperienced traveler “…will
be just as good a guide, believing in the truth but not knowing it (97b).”
Both knowledge and true opinion are acquired by experience, but not given by
nature (98d). This is Socrates’ answer to Meno’s paradox: investigation, and
reason can identify the unknown. Socrates is asked again if virtue is a matter
of teaching, but argues against his own hypothesis (Virtue is knowledge) by
proposing if virtue was a matter of teaching, it would also have to be
knowledge, and then there would be teachers of virtue. However, there are no
teachers of virtue. Therefore, it is not the case virtue is a
matter of teaching and that it is knowledge so they can no longer
believe virtue is a kind of knowledge (99b). And yet, there are wise
leaders of the city not because of their knowledge, but from divine
inspiration like that granted to the Greek poets and oracles. But, we
still do not know what virtue really is in itself–in essence (100b).
The Logic of Meno
“A four
legged cow is a cow”—Bertand Russell
I want to use the same logical symbolism
introduced in the essay, “Bertrand Russell's Critique of Fregean Logico-Mathematical Objects,”
to examine the difficulties of defining the concept of virtue exemplified in
the Meno dialogue. The logician I.M. Copi worked out in his
textbook, “Symbolic Logic: Fourth edition” (1973), p. 150, the symbolic
conventions for representing attributes of a thing, and the attributes
of attributes.
Let the attributes of a thing be
symbolized as F
An attribute of individual things =F
Some Attributes = (∃F)
All attributes = (F)
The essay on mathematical objects
logically demonstrates how attributes of attributes must be separated (Ramified Type Theory)
from attributes (x is truthful) and attributes of attributes (truthfulness is a
virtue); otherwise, the symbolism becomes contradictory (Russell’s Paradox).
“Ramified” is from Latin that means “branches,” or in this case
branches of multi-purpose meanings of the word “virtue” as defined by
Meno. I learned from MacIntyre himself that “there is no single, central,
core conception of the virtues (AV., p. 186, 187)”; also, there is a “problem
of multiple sets of virtues: "set of virtues: friendship, courage,
self-restraint, wisdom, justice (AV., p. 134).” For example, there are the
four cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and courage (AV., p.
167). There are also theological virtues such as faith, hope, and charity (AV.,
p. 168 ). This is known as “the problem of the unity of virtues…(AV., p.
179).” When asked what virtue is Meno gives an entire list of
core virtues (72b). Socrates did not want properties of virtue
(shapes of virtue), but rather a definition of virtue
itself (What is shape itself?).
If we mix attributes with “attributes of
attributes,” we commit The fallacy of Μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, or “switching to a
different genus” there is a danger of deriving a contradiction since “Where
the meta-base is not explicitly made as an analogy, it leads to a sudden leap
in a line of argument or argument in which one incorrectly no longer treats the
original object of the argument but a completely different one.”
And so we must add another rule:
attribute of attributes is symbolized in boldface italic capital letters ‘A’,’B’.
‘C’,….’Z’
Now our logical symbolism enables us to
state the following atomic propositions, and many more in principle, without
contradiction.
Ux : x is Unpunctual
Tx : x is Truthful
VF: F is
a Virtue
FF : F is
a Fault
GF: F is Good
FU :Unpunctuality is
a Fault
UF: F is Useful
DF: F is Desirable
VT :Truthfulness is
a Virtue
VC: Courage is a Virtue
We must keep in mind the distinction
between goods things and good conduct, and
whether they share the same most universal properties that can
be found in any particular instance of virtue; but we must
define virtue first in order to do any systematic categorization.
Moore would say that virtue is a “simple”
notion that cannot be defined; we can define complex notions
since they can be described by listing its properties; a horse for example,
until the parts can no longer be defined. By “undefined” he means,
“there is nothing whatsoever which we could so substitute for good; and that is
what I mean, when I say that good is indefinable (“Principia Ethica” (1903)(pdf.)
para. 8 ).”
Examples of propositions in symbolic
form:
(F)(UF⊃ DF)
(All useful attributes are desirable.)
(∃F)(DF⊃ ~UF)
(Some desirable attributes are not useful.)
…or more complex compound propositions:
(x){[Mx *
(F)(VF⊃ Fx)] ⊃ Vx} * (∃x)[(Mx *Vx) *
(∃F)(VF *~Fx)]
(A man who possesses all virtues is a virtuous man, but there are virtuous men who do not possess all virtue.)
Definitions:
Vx: x is virtuous
Mx: x is a man
(F): For all attributes
VF: F is a virtue
(∃F): For at least one attribute
(∃x): For at least one x
(x): For all x
⊃ : If, then conditional statement
* : and
~ : negationSocrates argues that if virtue
was a matter of teaching, it would also have to be knowledge, and then there
would be teachers of virtue. However, there are no teachers of virtue.
Therefore, it is not the case virtue is a matter
of teaching and that it is knowledge so they can no longer
believe virtue is a kind of knowledge (99b).
Socrates’ argument in symbolic form:
1.) (x){[(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] ⊃
(∃y)(Hy)}
For any x, if all virtue is teachable,
then virtue is knowledge; then there is at least one teacher of virtue.
2.) (y)~(Hy)
There are no teachers of virtue.
___________________________________________
3.) ~ [(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx]
Therefore, virtue is not teachable, nor
is it knowledge.
Formal Proof is the following:
1) (x){[(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] ⊃
(∃y)(Hy)}
2) (y)~(Hy)
/:: (x) ~[(Vx * Tx) ⊃
Kx]
________________________________________________
3) [(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] ⊃
(∃y)(Hy) ..........1, Universal
Instantiation
4) ~(∃y)(Hy)
......................................2, Equivalence
5) ~ [(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx]
.........................3, 4, Modus Tollens
6) (x) ~[(Vx * Tx) ⊃
Kx]......................5, Universal
Generalization
Variable Definitions and Rules:
V = virtue
T = virtue is teachable
K = knowledge
H = teachers of virtue
/:: = therefore
≡ = Equivalent truth value
Quantification operators:
(x)Φx ≡ Everything is
~(x)Φx ≡ Nothing is
(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is
~(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is not Equivalence of quantification operators
with negation symbol:
(x)Φx ≡ ~(∃x)~Φx
(∃x)Φx ≡ ~(x)~Φx
(x)~Φx ≡ ~(∃x)Φx
(∃x)~Φ ≡ ~(x)Φx I am always looking for tautologies such
as “A one legged cow is a cow.” Let’s symbolize “A Good Swiss
watch,” as (G * W), or expressed in predicate
logic as:
GW ≡ (∃x)(Gx * Wx)
(Some good Swiss watch)
1) (∃x)(Gx * Wx)
2) Gy * Wy
.....1, Existential Instantiation: “y” is unknown, or ambiguous name.
3) Gy
..............2, Simplification
/:: (∃x)(Gx) ........3, Existential
Generalization
In other words,
(G * W) ⊃ G
( If G and W; then, G)
…. which is a tautology that can be repeated tirelessly with other attributes
D, E, F, G, ect….(“A one legged cow is a cow; a two legged…ect.).”
This is why Socrates asked Meno for the whole of virtue, and
not the parts. Is the following passage using the term “good”
tautologically?
“...we define both 'watch' and 'farmer'
in terms of the purpose or function which a watch or a farmer are
characteristically expected to serve. It follows that the concept of a watch
cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch nor the concept
of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; and that the criterion of
something's being a watch and the criterion of something's being a good
watch-and so also for 'farmer' and for all other functional concepts-are not
independent of each other (AV., p. 58 )."
The value of logic is not just that
proofs can be derived and demonstrated, but merely attempting to translate an
argument from ordinary language into symbolic form discloses problems of
meaning that result in many arguments failing this first step of analysis. So
far our examination of virtue has identified at least three problems:
- We must distinguish
between attributes and the more abstract attributes
of attributes otherwise a contradiction will result.
- There are multiple
sets of core virtues and relationships between virtue and
attributes such as goodness (VG), justice(VJ),
faith (VA), and friendship(VR);
nor is it clear if the relations are ones of causal entailment,
tautological stipulation, contingent accident, or logically necessary.
- We still do not know
what virtue (V) is in itself.
Reductio-ad-absurdum direct
proof of invalidity that Socrates is “postmodern.”
“Deprived
of that context and of that justification, as a result of disruptive and transform
native social and moral changes in the late middle ages and the early modern
world, moral rules and precepts had to be understood in a new way
and assigned some new status, authority, and justification (AV., p. IX)(bold
my emphasis)."—Alasdair MacIntyre
A key thesis of After-Virtue claims that postmodernism is a “new”
phenomenon,“…a new dark ages which are already upon us (AV.,
p. 263)”; a “new morality (Ibid., p. 22, 205)”; “relatively
new the notion was in the culture of the Enlightenment (Ibid., p.
26, 38 )";… “Enlightenment project of discovering new rational
secular foundations for morality…(Ibid., p. 117)”; "...that
rejection the concepts both of value and of fact acquired a new character (Ibid.,
p. 77). Presenting modern philosophical dilemmas in ethics and epistemology as
a “new” modern malaise obscures the fact that postmodernism is
really the unresolved philosophical questions of the ancient world. MacIntyre
argues that modernism has attacked the premodern Aristotelian philosophy in a
conspiracy to promote the aporetic belief that controversies
in politics and morals are relativistic and unsettleable (Ibid., p.
6, 8, 26, 118, 227, 252). Interestingly, MacIntyre does say “something like”
Aristotelian philosophy could overcome modern ethical relativism (Ibid.,
p. 118 ). We might be surprised what that “something” could be.
Seemingly forgetful of his earlier criticism of analytic empiricism’s new focus
on ethical language, MacIntyre acknowledges Plato addressing the incoherence of
“evaluative language” of ancient Athens (Ibid., p.
131), but does not mention the Meno dialogue in After-Virtue, and
only in passing in “Whose Justice? Which Rationality?” And yet he
wrote this same kind of logical analysis as a moral disorder, ”…we
simultaneously and inconsistently treat moral argument as an exercise of our
rational powers and as mere expressive assertion-are symptoms of moral
disorder…( Ibid., p. 11).” The first half of After
Virtue presents the loss of telos as something new (Ibid.,
p. 62, 148 ), but then later argues the lose of telos in Stoicism anticipated
modernity (Ibid., p. 169). Socrates’ method is described in
passing as “…those who unreflectively rely on ordinary usage, on what
they have been taught, will all too easily find themselves trapped in
inconsistency in just the way that Socrates' partners in dialogue so often are (Ibid.,
p. 134),” but does not further address the aporetic character of the Socratic
dialogues, and in fact shuns all aporia.
The meaning of postmodernism is sort of
a null bit-bucket that one can toss the philosophies of ethical relativism (Ibid.,
p. xii), ethical skepticism, epistemological relativism, Bloomsbury aesthetes,
and nihilism (Ibid., p. 15, 72). Socrates’ skepticism is enough
to label him “postmodern” by the philosophical criteria of After
Virtue that renders “postmodernism” an ambiguous useless term
when considering Socrates was a premodern philosopher.
The direct proof of invalidity by Reductio ad absurdum works
by deriving a contradiction from the examined argument’s own premises thereby
showing the conclusion to be impossible—and is therefore invalid
(inconsistent). Direct proof is the method that will be applied to the argument
that Socrates is a postmodern philosopher according to the criteria found
in After Virtue.
*The indirect proof of validity works by
assuming the negation of the conclusion of a proposed valid argument to derive
a contradiction to show the negation of the argument’s valid conclusion is
absurd—and is therefore valid (consistent). This method will not be used in the
argument below.
Definitions:
E= Ethical Skepticism
M= Modern philosophy
~M= Postmodern philosophy
S= Socrates
P=Premodern Philosopher
⊃ : If, then conditional statement
* : and
~ : negation
1.) Ethical skepticism (E)
is a postmodernist (~M) philosophy.
2.) Socrates (S)
is an Ethical skeptic (E)_
3.) Therefore, Socrates is
a postmodernist (~M) philosopher. (1,2, Hypothetical
Syllogism)
The Platonic Socrates is a premodern (P)
philosopher (470-399 B.C). The Platonic Socrates represents in the Meno ethical
skepticism regarding the questions of virtue. Ethical skepticism, relativism,
and nihilism have been represented all through history and are not unique to
premodern, modern, or the so-called postmodern eras. The Platonic Socrates
discussed the very same “pre-modern concept of the virtues (Ibid.,
p. 205)” that MacIntyre is preoccupied.
4.) Socrates is not a
postmodern philosopher (~M).
5.) Socrates is a premodern
philosopher (P).
6.) Pre-modern philosophy
is not postmodernism (~M).
Summary of premises in sentential
logical form:
1.) E ⊃ ~M
2.) S ⊃ E
3.) (S ⊃ ~M)
4.) ~(S ⊃ ~M)
5.) S ⊃ P
6.) ~(P ⊃ ~M)
7.) Socrates is a postmodern
philosopher (~M) and not the
case Socrates is a postmodern philosopher (~M). (3,4, Conjunction)
REDUCTION AD ABSURDUM: If we accept
premises 1 thru 4, then we derived the contradiction in
proposition 7 as proof of invalidity.
7.) (S ⊃ ~M) * ~(S ⊃ ~M) (3,4,
Conjunction)
Ockham’s Razor
Shaves All Those Philosophers Who Cannot Shave Themselves.
{(∃x)[Ox * (y)(Py ⊃ Sxy)] * ~Syy}
However, Socrates is not the only
philosopher doing his part to undermine Western Civilization; later in history
others appeared as biting gadflies against the opinions of the crowd; take for
example, the French scholastic theologian, logician, Peter Abelard (1079
–142 A.D.); Scottish Catholic Franciscan priest, friar, professor
theology Duns Scotus (1265/66
–1308 ), and English Franciscan friar, theologian William of Ockham (1285-1347
A.D.).
Peter Abelard was a skillful logician born
during the era of Middle Platonism (90 B.C- 300 AD.), and is known as the “Descartes
of the 12th century” for his attack on Platonic realism that is the belief
universal concepts (words) are actual real things which all existing
entities participate. Abelard fiercely opposed this synthesis of Christianity
and Platonism by applying his ontological doctrine known as “nominalism,”
or “conceptualism” that argues a universal is merely a name (nomen),
and not a thing, or object existing objectively in another
transcendent world, and to believe so is to erroneously reify abstract
concepts; an inherent tendency of language. Abelard’s critique of
reification had little impact at the time, but he still was able to found the
first secular university system. He also formulated the legal concept of intent as
an element of a criminal act.
Then again in the 14th century the
Franciscan scholar Dun Scotus presented the ontological concept of “univocity of being” which
holds being (or beingness) is the property of all
real things so that to say “X is a real thing” has one stable meaning
so that “words describing the properties
of God mean the same thing as when they apply to people or things.”
Unfortunately, this doctrine conflicted with the theological belief that God
created all things so now God becomes a being among created beings.
According to professor of philosophy and theology, Paul Tyson, author of, “Retuning
to Reality,” Cascade Books, (2014), p. 67, Scotus was attempting to
create an absolute divide between an infinite God, and finite being to retain
God’s absolute transcendence. Tyson traces this evolution of nominalism in the
Middle Ages to its dominance in the Enlightenment.
And yet again the nominalist philosopher
Williams of Ockham revisited the problem of universals in the High Middle Ages.
Ockham’s metaphysical nominalism involved him in a life and death struggle with
Pope John XXII that resulted in him calling the Pope a heretic. Nominalism
argues that only individual things exist in reality resulting in an ontological
dichotomy of the natural sinful world, and a super-natural transcendent other
world. This bi-level ontology creates a separation between the secular world
and the sacred (Ibid., p. 54, 74, 141). Tyson notes that this
disjointed reality breaks the participatory link between God and all particular
created entities--and this happened even before Descartes, Bacon, and Galileo (Ibid.,
p. 141). Hegel identified this bifocal worldview as displaying a pattern of
consciousness formed by two disconnected perceived realities as the “unhappy
consciousness (Phenomenology of Spirit, para.197)(pdf.).”
The critics of postmodernism are trying
to distort history giving the false impression that the conflicts between
nominalism, relativism, modernism, and Christian theology are somehow wholly
unique and new today.
…next:
After-Virtue’s Critique of Metaethical Emotivism
