Appendix G, Part I of V: Postmodern Socrates on Virtue

Postmodern Socrates on Virtue

“The fact is that far from knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue is…Not only that, you may say also that, to the best of my belief, I have never met anyone who did know.”—Socrates in Plato’s dialogue, Meno, (pdf.), para. 71 and 71c.

“My advice to you, if you will listen to it, is to be careful.”
—Anytus to Socrates, Meno, para. 94e.

 

Introduction:

Of all of the major areas of study in philosophy--epistemology, metaphysics, and ethics (some would include the history of philosophy)—ethics is by far the most difficult and complex to analyze as ethical discourse incorporates historical beliefs, metaphysical assumptions, and normative ethical rules (what one ought to do). Notice that the word discourse has already biased this introduction by focusing on the examination of moral language such as the terms “good,” “better,” “obligation,” “wrong,” “right” and “virtue.” Integration by individuals of different worldviews, cultural moral concepts, and the rational justifications of moral actions make the use of normative ethical terms the obvious area for the philosophy of language to investigate with its applied methodology of logical analysis. There is an apparent parallelism, which we will investigate, between ethics and epistemology that is productive for clarifying ethical concepts until the meaning of some key terms become obscure and even irresolvable as various logical analyses inevitably separate into different seemingly contradictory camps of thought. 

The motive and purpose of this essay is to once again critique the ubiquitous trope (meaning “twist”) of “postmodernism.” Rhetorically, a trope is parasitical of some original meaning of a word, or theme, which is then used in a different sense that further degrades into a cliché like, for example, the “absent-minded professor,” as a fictional story character. Postmodernism is a collection of pre-selected philosophical disputes from the history of Western philosophy that are reinterpreted as somehow “new,” and representative of a contemporary existential threat to Western civilization organized by conspiratorial homunculi allied with deviant minions such as leftists, socialists, Marxists, dirty hippies, and romance novelist Jane Austen who understands “the virtues is a certain kind of marriage and indeed a certain kind of naval officer (that is, a certain kind of English naval officer)(AV., p. 186)” to promote a false ideology that denies the existence of all virtue, truth, and knowledge (Postmodernism and Faith, video). 

During the last few years a number of persons have recommended that I read Dr. Alasdair MacIntyre’s work on ethics entitled, “After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory,”(1981)(pdf.)(Abbreviated as AV). I chose to critique this particular book since Dr. MacIntyre can actually formulate arguments of his critique of postmodernism unlike those embarrassing self-described postmodern critics hanging around the Internet. MacIntyre published in his early career many academic articles on Marxism (MacIntyre bibliography) so he is sui generis, in a category of his own, separate from the media’s fast-talking former Marxists who couldn’t tell the difference between Karl Marx, and Carl B. Marks. He authored After Virtue at about the same time Neoliberalism swept over the Untied States in the form of Reagan’s cultural revolution of 1981: a Great March forward into despotism. MacIntyre used the term “postmodernist,” only once in “After-Virtue,(AV., p. XII) along with other terms such as “Enlightenment project,” (Ibid., p. 36), “post-Enlightenment culture,” (Ibid., p. 113), “modern culture,” “modern age,” and “modernity.”  In another book, “Whose Justice? Which Rationality?” (1988 )(pdf.)(WJWR), MacIntyre continues his extended argument with “post-Enlightenment culture,” (WJWR, p. 6) “postmodern relativists,” (Ibid., p. 353), and “postmodernist radicals, (Ibid., p. 387). All of these terms have the same meaning and are used interchangeably by postmodern critics. 

In the prologue of the third edition of After Virtue (2007) titled, “After Virtue after a Quarter of a Century,” MacIntyre writes of his personal beliefs [My bracket]: "When I wrote After Virtue, I was already an Aristotelian, but not yet a Thomist, something made plain in my account of Aquinas at the end of chapter 13 [Medieval Aspects and Occasions]. I became a Thomist after writing After Virtue in part because I became convinced that Aquinas was in some respects a better Aristotelian than Aristotle, that not only was he an excellent interpreter of Aristotle's texts, but that he had been able to extend and deepen both Aristotle’s metaphysical and his moral enquiries (p. X)." 

MacIntyre’s stated philosophical worldview can be accurately described as Aristotelian-Thomist Realism: “MacIntyre defends Thomistic realism as rational enquiry directed to the discovery of truth (IEP: MacIntyre).” I did not choose MacIntyre’s book for this critical essay because of any Catholic belief he may, or may not have. There are a number of Catholic based ethical philosophies that are admirable such as the Trappist Monk Thomas Merton advocated, but was murdered after he gave an anti-war speech in 1968 against the Vietnam War at the International Asiatic Conference in Thailand. Also, Pope John Paul II studied Phenomenologist, Max Scheler, and advocates a very interesting version of phenomenological Thomism resulting in the Pope’s dissertation titled "Reevaluation of the possibility of founding a Catholic ethic on the ethical system of Max Scheler.” Dorothy Day represents another case in which this religious tradition is recognized as consistent with labor activism that values human beings, and inspired her to help create the Catholic Worker Movement. The Church awarded the title “Servant of God“ to Day and was positively mentioned by the very popular Pope Francis in 2015. My focus of concern here is not Catholicism, but rather the philosophical incoherence of the postmodern trope I have described. 

Dr. MacIntyre is difficult to critique for three reasons. First, he has authored a massive number of books and articles during his lifetime. Since I have only one lifetime, and unable to read all of his writings, I will have to be satisfied with a parity check for possible incoherence of his relevant views on virtue. After Virtue conceptually contains in substance many of his most important philosophical writings, and themes. For example, his journal article, “Epistemological Crises, Dramatic Narrative, and the Philosophy of Science,” (1977)(pdf.)(abbreviation, EC)  is recapitulated in “After Virtue: Chapter Seven: 'Fact', Explanation and Expertise.” 

Secondly, MacIntyre is a masterful rhetorician and his writing is among the best a person can read in the English language. His training in Aristotelian philosophy shows through his artfully crafted written words and arguments: each sentence is packed with meaning in a complex chain of other arguments that make it a challenge to construct clear and concise corresponding counter-arguments. This highly intelligent philosopher is also a skillful escape artist who is difficult to pin down on some points as he anticipates potential criticism while moving strategically in and around the complicated passages of Aristotle’s taxonomy of virtue. After-Virtue is complex as MacIntyre dives into ancient philosophy, Western Medieval thought, and modern British analytic language philosophy. 

Lastly, MacIntyre’s After Virtue is difficult to critique because there are certain argument threads that I agree with, but which are entangled with other postmodern critiques that I found logically problematic. Some of the topics that I thought were very good and learned from are the following: his very short summary of Kierkegaard is very good short summary (AV., p. 39); his critique of modern social sciences and modern inductive methodologies (Ibid., p. 88 ); Homer’s heroic poetry of the Iliad and Socrates on Homeric ethics (Ibid., p. 121, 131); the Virtues of Athens chapter gave criticism of ideological individualism and emphasized the need for friendship and community instead of promoting Pleonexia, or excessive greed, and acquisitiveness (Ibid., p. 137, 208, 214, 227); the importance of Narrative for social life (Ibid., p. 137, 227); dominance of the modern bureaucratic manager model with a critique of work in modern society (Ibid., p. 228 ); examined Phronesis, or the ability to exercise good intellectual judgment as a virtue (Ibid., p. 154); criticism of imperialism, or original acquisition (Ibid., p.251). I generally accept MacIntyre’s expertise in After-Virtue regarding the doctrines Aristotelian and Thomistic. 

There are some problematic issues with weaving a critique of postmodernism into this study of virtue, but I want to be open about the criteria used in formulating my criticisms of the many complex arguments MacIntyre presents so that my reasoning can be followed. I am keeping in mind three philosophers as my philosophical touchstones: Logician Ludwig Wittgenstein (mostly his later thought), Transcendental Kantian criticism, and existentialist Soren Kierkegaard. Wittgenstein studied both Kant and Kierkegaard very closely, and deeply influenced his study of philosophy. 

Within this essay are four major counter-arguments directed toward MacIntyre’s definition and criticisms of postmodernism: 

1. If consistently applied, MacIntyre’s view of postmodernism defines the premodern  philosopher, Socrates, as postmodern.
2. MacIntyre as an Aristotelian-Thomist Realist contradictorily embraces Anti-realist epistemology.
3. MacIntyre leaves the door open for Relativistic Historicism while advocating a particular tradition of ethical thought.
4. MacIntyre’s viewpoint is subject to Ethical Skepticism compounded by 2 and 3.

 

First Counter-argument: “Postmodern” Socrates 

 

“In my opinion you are well advised not to leave Athens and live abroad. If you behaved like this as a foreigner in another country, you would most likely be arrested as a wizard.”—Meno to Socrates, 80b. 

I.F. Stone directs our attention to the word “wizard,” or "γόης" (goes) that Meno used to describe Socrates as “one who howls out enchantments, a sorcerer,” and metaphorically a “juggler”, or “cheat,” and “imposter” (I.F. Stone, “The Trial of Socrates,”(1988 ), Little, Brown & Co., Boston, p. 59). Western philosophical literature on ethics is at least as old as the Epic of Gilgamesh, an ancient epic poem authored about 3000 BC. The ideal arena for our purposes of discussion is Plato’s famous dialogue, the Meno, since it contains fundamental problems of ethics that can bring together the thoughts of philosophers such as MacIntyre, G.E. Moore, Kierkegaard, and Wittgenstein for examination. 

My guiding touchstones for reading After Virtue are interestingly related. For MacIntyre, English philosopher G.E. Moore is exhibit “A” of the folly of postmodernism, while Kierkegaard’s corpse is presented as exhibit “B” of the ravages of modernist disease. MacIntyre does not mention Wittgenstein in After Virtue, but Wittgenstein and G.E. Moore were both contemporary professors at Trinity College, Cambridge along with Bertrand Russell. G.E. Moore, who was at one time president of the Aristotelian Society at Cambridge, is recognized as one of the early founders of analytic language philosophy. The School of Logical Positivism known as the “Vienna Circle” (1924) was founded in the name of Wittgenstein for his philosophical work, “Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus” (1921)(pdf.), before he was discovered by the positivists to be a radical mystic. Although Wittgenstein did not have a high regard for Moore as a philosopher, he was influenced by Moore’s view on ethics, which will be noted. 

The Meno dialogue contains ethical problems by which we can categorize various normative views on virtue in order to interpret their ethical (what ought to be) and metaethical (what is) standpoints; then, identify them by classificatory scheme as a cognitivist, noncognitivist, naturalist, nonnaturalist, objectivist, non-objectivist, anti-realist and/or realist. We will kindly consider objections to our Procrustean classifications, which might be raised by passionate disciples that do not like being pigeonholed. This approach provides a common referential framework to explore these ever-elusive ethical dilemmas, and will strengthen all four objections against MacIntyre’s criticisms of modernism. 

A Very Short Background on the Socratic Dialogue, Meno: “On Virtue” 

MacIntyre dates the Meno dialogue during Plato’s late period of authorship (WJWR, p. 63). The Meno is a fictional dialogue written by Plato in 385 B.C. about real historical persons and events during 402 B.C.  which is about three years before the trial of Socrates. Ancient scholars later subtitled this dialogue as “On Virtue” as a sequel to the Protagoras dialogue wherein Socrates claims that virtue is knowledge; therefore, it must be something teachable (I.F. Stone, p. 52-68 ). During this period Athens was just emerging from a terrible dictatorship and civil war. Beginning back in 490 B.C. to 480 B.C. Athens and Sparta had successfully combined forces to oppose and repel the Persian invasion of Greece. However, later in 430 BC, Sparta declared war against it former ally, Athens, for breaking a peace treaty and began a long series of battles called the Peloponnesian Wars. Also, this was the time that a reoccurring Typhus plague begins in Athens that killed about 100,000 Athenians as Sparta laid siege against the crowded fortified city. Finally, the Peloponnesian wars between Athens and Sparta ended with the defeat of Athens at Aigospotamoi.

 

Years later in 404 B.C. the “Rule of the Thirty Tyrants” begins supported by Athenian oligarchs treasonously allying themselves with Sparta. Just prior to the events in the dialogue Meno, Spartan rulers were thinking about murdering all the Athenian men and enslaving everyone else, but then on reflection thought it more profitable to establish an oligarchy backed by the wealthy Athenian aristocracy of which Socrates had some distance family relations. During the régime’s short eight months reign, the Thirty were able to torture and execute without trial at least 1500 Athenians thought to be democratic subversives, and hired 300 "lash-bearers" to whip the Athenians to instill collective fear of the regime. Plato recounts in the Apology dialogue how the Thirty ordered him and four men to capture and execute an Athenian citizen named Leon of Salamis. Plato provides an interesting explanation for the Thirty’s execution orders and why so many Greeks were executed: “…they issued such instructions, their object being to implicate as many people as possible in their crimes (32c-d).” This is a history Americans should remember even today as right-wing fascists encourage election fraud and violent insurrection. Socrates was also ordered by the Tyrants to commit the same crime of execution as Plato was asked to do, but just laughed: both philosophers refused to cooperate putting their lives in great danger.

 

And then the tables turned. Belligerent former democratic forces of Athens in May 403 B.C. defeated the Thirty Tyrants and their military henchmen. The events in the Meno occurred in “late January, or early February 402 B.C. (IEP: Meno).” The atmosphere was politically very tense while Athenian pro-democratic leaders were negotiating with the oligarchs an amnesty for crimes committed during the former tyrannical régime-- except for the Thirty themselves and about 3,000 officials who were not to be spared punishment. Two of the Thirty were a cousin and uncle related to Socrates. And then one last outrage committed by the oligarchs was to massacre the people in the town of Eleusis, and then used the city as a base from which followed yet another insurrectionist attack against Athens in 401 B.C. that brought about the Tyrant’s final defeat by Athens.

 

This is the history that Plato knows from lived experience and set Socrates speaking to Meno, and the unhappy Anytus about virtue. The formerly leading moderate demos politician, Anytus, had to pay a bribe to the Thirty’s court that cost him all of his wealth as the owner of a tannery (I.F, Stone, p. 174-180). While writing the Meno, Plato knew that in 399 B.C. Socrates would be executed partly due to Anytus’ guilty vote at his trial. There are many stories of Anytus’ demise; they are all contradictory, and none of them have happy endings. Plato also knew that the mercenary soldier, Meno, was to join the soon defeated Persian army of Cyrus who was attempting to overthrow his own brother, King Artaxerxes II. Cyrus’ defeated enemy commanders were beheaded--except for Meno who was so hated for his greed for wealth and power that he instead suffered prolonged torture before finally being executed (IEP:Meno). I.F. Stone comments that during early antiquity there was not a clear distinction between trade and war (I.F.Stone, p. 26).

 

During this setting of simmering civil war and gratuitous executions, Socrates appears in Athens asking, “What is virtue?” I.F. Stone reminds us virtue, or “ἀρετή,” (Arête) is derived from the name of the Greek god of war Ares, whose Roman name is Mars. Virtue was believed to be goodness and excellence, which meant to the Greeks “machismo, manliness, valor, and prowess.” “Virtue” is from the Latin term “vitus” or “life”. If virtue were knowledge, it would include the mercenary’s training in military weaponry and actual war experience (Ibid., p. 52). Socrates noted that Cleophantes, the son of the highly respected Athenian Themistocoles, “was well trained in horsemanship that he could stand upright on a horseback and throw a javelin from that position, and many other wonderful accomplishments the young man had, for his father had him taught and made expert in every skill that a good instructor could impart (Meno, 93d).”

 

The Poverty of Philosophy…of Ethics

 “The fact is that far form knowing whether it can be taught, I have no idea what virtue itself is. That is my own case. I share the poverty of my fellow countrymen in this respect….”—Socrates in the Meno (71a). 

Plato’s dialogues can be read on multiple levels: the philosophical problems discussed; logical structure; dialogue storyline narrative; the characters and their interactions with other participants. One can read for Plato’s sarcastic humor, “But look, Meno, here’s a piece of luck. Anytus has just sat down beside us (90a),” or when Socrates complains of his bad memory (Meno, 70c, 76b) just before introducing his Theory of Recollection. And interestingly, another level of interpretation is Plato’s beliefs as compared to Socrates’ views on the theme of each dialogue. This is especially difficult since there are no surviving writings by Socrates except for student lecture notes; in addition, it is especially difficult when the dialogue such as the Meno ends in no firm conclusion about what virtue is. Socrates held to the theory knowledge as remembrance, but Plato later seems to give it up. All students should remember to take good notes! 

Ancient scholars have named the early Platonic dialogues as the Aporetic dialogues which include the following works: Apology, Critias, Euthydemus, Euthyphro, Gorgias, Laches, Lysis, Protagoras, and Meno. There is debate on some of the dialogue classifications as early. MacIntyre for example places the Meno in the late period of authorship, while some others place it in the early late period. The Greek term “ἀπορίᾳ” when translated with reference to place means “difficulty of passing.” “πορίᾳ” without an alpha “ἀ” means a “pathway,” but combined with the letter “ἀ” a negative prefix (alpha privative) changes the meaning to “no pathway, or “no way out.” However, when applied to persons, aporia means “poverty,” and this is Socrates’ metaphor for the Athenians’ inability to define virtue (Meno, 71b). In the Meno, Plato makes use of a method of argument known as the “Elenchus,” or ἔλεγξις meaning, “refuting,’ or “reproving,” and is the Socratic method of deriving a contradiction by having the speaker go through cross-examination and argumentation to eventually agree with a conclusion that is directly opposite to their originally held beliefs. Socrates does this multiple times in discourse with Meno on virtue (73e, 78b, 80a). 

Woke Socrates

“The unexamined life is not worth living.”-Socrates, Apology (38a)

This section will summarize the Meno (pdf. with Stephanus pagination!) dialogue’s logical structure for later argument analysis. 

Meno begins asking if virtue can be taught (70a). Socrates in turn asks Meno to define virtue, but Meno instead gives a list of different kinds of virtues such as the good management of city affairs; to help his friends and harm their foes; a woman’s obedience and household management; and other virtues for children, old men, slaves, and freemen (71e). Notice Meno’s list of virtues is about conduct. Socrates objects to Meno’s attempt to simply list virtues, but instead he wants the essence, or universal property of virtue, and not individual virtues (72b). Socrates introduced the analogies of Bees (72b), shape (73e), and color (74d) in asking Meno to not describe what bees, shapes, and colors are in particular, but what is a bee in general, or what shape, or color are in themselves. Socrates is focused on finding a definition of virtue in ethical discourse.

Search for Essences

Within Husserlian phenomenology the method for defining an essence is called Eidetic Reduction where by a concept, or some experience, or a phenomenon is varied by observation, and imagination to derive its universal property, or essence in formulating a clear meaning. “Eidetic” is from Greek, εἶδος, (eidos), meaning “that which is seen, form, shape, or  figure.”​ Socrates refers specifically to shape. Phenomenological reduction is the method where by the phenomenologist strips away, or omits all the accidental attributes of a phenomenon, and leaves only the necessary attributes known as its “essence.” Words are essences, and from them we formulate definitions. Phenomenology is the most extreme version of empiricism, but even with this radical empiricism notice that the “negative act” of “omission” of accidental attributes is an indispensable step for determining essence. (Philosophy of Symbolic Forms: Phenomenology of Knowledge, E. Cassirer, 1957, Vol. III, p.193)(pdf.). 

Socrates questions Meno for another definition that is singular and universal such as his friend Gorgias’ views on virtue (73d). One quality, according to Gorgias, is the ability to govern men. Socrates objects again arguing this definition should not apply to slaves, or a child so both agree to add “justice as a virtue.” Socrates gives further objections reminding Meno they are looking for the whole of virtue, and not parts of virtue (73e). Meno’s next attempt defines virtue as desiring fine things and being able to acquire them (77b).  Socrates seizes on the term “desire.” Meno believes men do desire evil things (77c) even if it is evil, but then recants after Socrates convinces him that no person desires evil since it brings injury and unhappiness to themselves (78b); maybe not Socrates strongest argument. Socrates does not consider it to be virtuous if someone acquires good things unjustly; rather, justice, temperance, or piety, or some other attribute of virtue must be connected to acquisition if we are to consider it virtuous (78e). But again Socrates reminds Meno they want the whole of virtue, and agreed they cannot define it in terms of its parts! So they must go back to the beginning of their inquiry (79c). 

Geometry and Virtue

At this point the discussion turns to Meno’s dilemma of how could someone recognize something unknown that is being sought after (80d). As a phenomenological experiment Socrates asks a slave a series of simple geometry questions to demonstrate innate, or a prior knowledge (82a-86a). Notice Socrates’ theory of innate knowledge is based on the subjective experience of calculative thinking in making an inference to a conclusion that is phenomenologically similar to the subjective experience of remembering. Later on we will see how the phenomenological method of description is important to G.E. Moore’s analysis of ethical discourse and is completely missed by his critics—including Wittgenstein. Socrates’ experiment is also making a comparison between answering geometric questions and seeking answers about virtue. Unlike the confused Meno and Anytus, the slave is much more successful answering Socrates’ geometry questions. 

Socrates will return to Meno’s dilemma later in the dialogue, but now he wants to explore the hypothesis of what attribute of the soul must exist if it can be taught (87b). Virtue is good and so it is also advantageous (87e) unlike the attributes of health, strength, good looks, or wealth that could do us harm if not used wisely. When guided by wisdom—not ignorance—the advantages of courage, temperance, wit, and memory will bring happiness (88c). Consequently, virtue must be some kind of knowing and not by some innate nature (89a). Socrates proposes a second hypothesis: if something were teachable, there would be teachers and students (89d).  However, Socrates says he has not found any teachers of virtue (89d). 

A Bad Case of Homunculus Anytus-itis 

The financially bankrupted Anytus joins the discussion with Socrates and is asked if he found any teachers of virtue like, for example, the sophist (89e) to which Anytus strongly rejects declaring he would have nothing to do with such folks since any Athenian gentleman is a better man than any of them (91c). Anytus believed that a group of foreigners and other undesirables were under-minding the Athenian polis by questioning its tradition of virtue ethics, and Greek divinities (atheism). Socrates responds that one can be a good man and not a good teacher of virtue; take for example, the sons of some of the best men of Athens. If virtue could be taught, they would have passed it to their children. This comment angers Anytus thinking that Socrates is referring to him and his friends: "I think, Socrates, that you readily speak ill of men. I would advise you, if you are willing to listen to me, to be discreet. As is probably the case in other cities, it is easier to do men harm than good, and certainly in this one. But I think you already know that (94e)." Socrates continues his argument: if there are no teachers, there can be no students (96b). 

Socratic Aporia 

Socrates now answers Meno’s dilemma of trying to identify something, such as virtue, that seems to have no agreed definition. Socrates claims knowledge for the purpose of acting rightly is not the only source of virtue; true opinion could also lead to virtue just as a person who never traveled the road to Larissa could guide others just as well an experienced guide with knowledge. Meno counters that true opinion is not certain for making judgments. Socrates responds that true opinion must be “tied down” by reason to determine if an opinion is true. In this particular dialogue knowledge is a justified true belief that separates it from true opinion, and that an inexperienced traveler “…will be just as good a guide, believing in the truth but not knowing it (97b).” Both knowledge and true opinion are acquired by experience, but not given by nature (98d). This is Socrates’ answer to Meno’s paradox: investigation, and reason can identify the unknown. Socrates is asked again if virtue is a matter of teaching, but argues against his own hypothesis (Virtue is knowledge) by proposing if virtue was a matter of teaching, it would also have to be knowledge, and then there would be teachers of virtue. However, there are no teachers of virtue. Therefore, it is not the case virtue is a matter of teaching and that it is knowledge so they can no longer believe virtue is a kind of knowledge (99b). And yet, there are wise leaders of the city not because of their knowledge, but from divine inspiration like that granted to the Greek poets and oracles. But, we still do not know what virtue really is in itself–in essence (100b).

The Logic of Meno

“A four legged cow is a cow”—Bertand Russell

I want to use the same logical symbolism introduced in the essay, “Bertrand Russell's Critique of Fregean Logico-Mathematical Objects,” to examine the difficulties of defining the concept of virtue exemplified in the Meno dialogue. The logician I.M. Copi worked out in his textbook, “Symbolic Logic: Fourth edition” (1973), p. 150, the symbolic conventions for representing attributes of a thing, and the attributes of attributes. 

Let the attributes of a thing be symbolized as F 

An attribute of individual things =F

Some Attributes = (∃F)

All attributes = (F) 

The essay on mathematical objects logically demonstrates how attributes of attributes must be separated (Ramified Type Theory) from attributes (x is truthful) and attributes of attributes (truthfulness is a virtue); otherwise, the symbolism becomes contradictory (Russell’s Paradox). “Ramified” is from Latin that means “branches,” or in this case branches of multi-purpose meanings of the word “virtue” as defined by Meno. I learned from MacIntyre himself that “there is no single, central, core conception of the virtues (AV., p. 186, 187)”; also, there is a “problem of multiple sets of virtues: "set of virtues: friendship, courage, self-restraint, wisdom, justice (AV., p. 134).” For example, there are the four cardinal virtues of justice, prudence, temperance, and courage (AV., p. 167). There are also theological virtues such as faith, hope, and charity (AV., p. 168 ). This is known as “the problem of the unity of virtues…(AV., p. 179).” When asked what virtue is Meno gives an entire list of core virtues (72b). Socrates did not want properties of virtue (shapes of virtue), but rather a definition of virtue itself (What is shape itself?). 

If we mix attributes with “attributes of attributes,” we commit The fallacy of Μετάβασις εἰς ἄλλο γένος, or “switching to a different genus” there is a danger of deriving a contradiction since “Where the meta-base is not explicitly made as an analogy, it leads to a sudden leap in a line of argument or argument in which one incorrectly no longer treats the original object of the argument but a completely different one.” 

And so we must add another rule: attribute of attributes is symbolized in boldface italic capital letters ‘A’,’B’. ‘C’,….’Z’ 

Now our logical symbolism enables us to state the following atomic propositions, and many more in principle, without contradiction.

 Ux : x is Unpunctual

Tx : x is Truthful

VF: F is a Virtue

FF : F is a Fault

GF: F is Good

FU :Unpunctuality is a Fault

UF: F is Useful

DF: F is Desirable

VT :Truthfulness is a Virtue

VC: Courage is a Virtue 

We must keep in mind the distinction between goods things and good conduct, and whether they share the same most universal properties that can be found in any particular instance of virtue; but we must define virtue first in order to do any systematic categorization. 

Moore would say that virtue is a “simple” notion that cannot be defined; we can define complex notions since they can be described by listing its properties; a horse for example, until the parts can no longer be defined. By “undefined” he means, “there is nothing whatsoever which we could so substitute for good; and that is what I mean, when I say that good is indefinable (“Principia Ethica” (1903)(pdf.) para. 8  ).” 

Examples of propositions in symbolic form:

(F)(UF⊃ DF)
(All useful attributes are desirable.)

(∃F)(DF⊃ ~UF)
(Some desirable attributes are not useful.)

 …or more complex compound propositions:

(x){[Mx * (F)(VF⊃ Fx)] ⊃ Vx} * (∃x)[(Mx *Vx) * (∃F)(VF *~Fx)]
(A man who possesses all virtues is a virtuous man, but there are virtuous men who do not possess all virtue.)

Definitions:

Vx: x is virtuous
Mx: x is a man
(F): For all attributes
VF: F is a virtue
(∃F): For at least one attribute
(∃x): For at least one x
(x): For all x
⊃ : If, then conditional statement
* : and
~ : negation

Socrates argues that if virtue was a matter of teaching, it would also have to be knowledge, and then there would be teachers of virtue. However, there are no teachers of virtue. Therefore, it is not the case virtue is a matter of teaching and that it is knowledge so they can no longer believe virtue is a kind of knowledge (99b). 

Socrates’ argument in symbolic form: 

1.)  (x){[(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] ⊃ (∃y)(Hy)}

For any x, if all virtue is teachable, then virtue is knowledge; then there is at least one teacher of virtue. 

2.)  (y)~(Hy)

There are no teachers of virtue.
___________________________________________

3.)  ~ [(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx]

Therefore, virtue is not teachable, nor is it knowledge.

Formal Proof is the following: 

1)    (x){[(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] ⊃ (∃y)(Hy)} 

2)    (y)~(Hy)                                         /:: (x) ~[(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx]

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3)    [(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] ⊃ (∃y)(Hy) ..........1, Universal Instantiation 

4)    ~(∃y)(Hy) ......................................2, Equivalence 

5)    ~ [(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx] .........................3, 4, Modus Tollens 

6)    (x) ~[(Vx * Tx) ⊃ Kx]......................5, Universal Generalization

Variable Definitions and Rules:

V = virtue
T = virtue is teachable
K = knowledge
H = teachers of virtue
/:: = therefore
≡ = Equivalent truth value

Quantification operators:

(x)Φx ≡ Everything is
~(x)Φx ≡ Nothing is
(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is
~(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is not 

Equivalence of quantification operators with negation symbol:

(x)Φx ≡ ~(∃x)~Φx
(∃x)Φx ≡ ~(x)~Φx
(x)~Φx ≡ ~(∃x)Φx
(∃x)~Φ ≡ ~(x)Φx 

I am always looking for tautologies such as “A one legged cow is a cow.” Let’s symbolize “A Good Swiss watch,” as (G * W), or expressed in predicate logic as: 

GW ≡ (∃x)(Gx * Wx)
(Some good Swiss watch)

1)    (∃x)(Gx * Wx) 

2)    Gy * Wy .....1, Existential Instantiation: “y” is unknown, or ambiguous name. 

3)    Gy ..............2, Simplification 

/:: (∃x)(Gx) ........3, Existential Generalization

In other words, 

(G * W) ⊃ G
( If G and W; then, G)

…. which is a tautology that can be repeated tirelessly with other attributes D, E, F, G, ect….(“A one legged cow is a cow; a two legged…ect.).” This is why Socrates asked Meno for the whole of virtue, and not the parts. Is the following passage using the term “good” tautologically? 

“...we define both 'watch' and 'farmer' in terms of the purpose or function which a watch or a farmer are characteristically expected to serve. It follows that the concept of a watch cannot be defined independently of the concept of a good watch nor the concept of a farmer independently of that of a good farmer; and that the criterion of something's being a watch and the criterion of something's being a good watch-and so also for 'farmer' and for all other functional concepts-are not independent of each other (AV., p. 58 )." 

The value of logic is not just that proofs can be derived and demonstrated, but merely attempting to translate an argument from ordinary language into symbolic form discloses problems of meaning that result in many arguments failing this first step of analysis. So far our examination of virtue has identified at least three problems:

1. We must distinguish between attributes and the more abstract attributes of attributes otherwise a contradiction will result.
2. There are multiple sets of core virtues and relationships between virtue and attributes such as goodness (VG), justice(VJ), faith (VA), and friendship(VR); nor is it clear if the relations are ones of causal entailment, tautological stipulation, contingent accident, or logically necessary.
3. We still do not know what virtue (V) is in itself.
   
   

Reductio-ad-absurdum direct proof of invalidity that Socrates is “postmodern.”

“Deprived of that context and of that justification, as a result of disruptive and transform native social and moral changes in the late middle ages and the early modern world, moral rules and precepts had to be understood in a new way and assigned some new status, authority, and justification (AV., p. IX)(bold my emphasis)."—Alasdair MacIntyre

A key thesis of After-Virtue claims that postmodernism is a “new” phenomenon,“…a new dark ages which are already upon us (AV., p. 263)”; a “new morality (Ibid., p. 22, 205)”; “relatively new the notion was in the culture of the Enlightenment (Ibid.,  p. 26, 38 )";… “Enlightenment project of discovering new rational secular foundations for morality…(Ibid., p. 117)”; "...that rejection the concepts both of value and of fact acquired a new character (Ibid., p. 77). Presenting modern philosophical dilemmas in ethics and epistemology as a “new” modern malaise obscures the fact that postmodernism is really the unresolved philosophical questions of the ancient world. MacIntyre argues that modernism has attacked the premodern Aristotelian philosophy in a conspiracy to promote the aporetic belief that controversies in politics and morals are relativistic and unsettleable (Ibid., p. 6, 8, 26, 118, 227, 252). Interestingly, MacIntyre does say “something like” Aristotelian philosophy could overcome modern ethical relativism (Ibid., p. 118 ). We might be surprised what that “something” could be. Seemingly forgetful of his earlier criticism of analytic empiricism’s new focus on ethical language, MacIntyre acknowledges Plato addressing the incoherence of “evaluative language” of ancient Athens (Ibid., p. 131), but does not mention the Meno dialogue in After-Virtue, and only in passing in “Whose Justice? Which Rationality?” And yet he wrote this same kind of logical analysis as a moral disorder, ”…we simultaneously and inconsistently treat moral argument as an exercise of our rational powers and as mere expressive assertion-are symptoms of moral disorder…( Ibid., p. 11).” The first half of After Virtue presents the loss of telos as something new (Ibid., p. 62, 148 ), but then later argues the lose of telos in Stoicism anticipated modernity (Ibid., p. 169). Socrates’ method is described in passing as “…those who unreflectively rely on ordinary usage, on what they have been taught, will all too easily find themselves trapped in inconsistency in just the way that Socrates' partners in dialogue so often are (Ibid., p. 134),” but does not further address the aporetic character of the Socratic dialogues, and in fact shuns all aporia. 

The meaning of postmodernism is sort of a null bit-bucket that one can toss the philosophies of ethical relativism (Ibid., p. xii), ethical skepticism, epistemological relativism, Bloomsbury aesthetes, and nihilism (Ibid., p. 15, 72). Socrates’ skepticism is enough to label him “postmodern” by the philosophical criteria of After Virtue that renders “postmodernism” an ambiguous useless term when considering Socrates was a premodern philosopher. 

The direct proof of invalidity by Reductio ad absurdum works by deriving a contradiction from the examined argument’s own premises thereby showing the conclusion to be impossible—and is therefore invalid (inconsistent). Direct proof is the method that will be applied to the argument that Socrates is a postmodern philosopher according to the criteria found in After Virtue. 

*The indirect proof of validity works by assuming the negation of the conclusion of a proposed valid argument to derive a contradiction to show the negation of the argument’s valid conclusion is absurd—and is therefore valid (consistent). This method will not be used in the argument below.

Definitions:

E= Ethical Skepticism
M= Modern philosophy
~M= Postmodern philosophy
S= Socrates
P=Premodern Philosopher
⊃ : If, then conditional statement
* : and
~ : negation

1.) Ethical skepticism (E) is a postmodernist (~M) philosophy.

2.) Socrates (S) is an Ethical skeptic (E)_

3.) Therefore, Socrates is a postmodernist (~M) philosopher. (1,2, Hypothetical Syllogism) 

The Platonic Socrates is a premodern (P) philosopher (470-399 B.C). The Platonic Socrates represents in the Meno ethical skepticism regarding the questions of virtue. Ethical skepticism, relativism, and nihilism have been represented all through history and are not unique to premodern, modern, or the so-called postmodern eras. The Platonic Socrates discussed the very same “pre-modern concept of the virtues (Ibid., p. 205)” that MacIntyre is preoccupied. 

4.) Socrates is not a postmodern philosopher (~M).

5.) Socrates is a premodern philosopher (P).

6.) Pre-modern philosophy is not postmodernism (~M). 

Summary of premises in sentential logical form:

1.) E ⊃ ~M             

2.) S ⊃ E               

3.) (S ⊃ ~M)           

4.) ~(S ⊃ ~M)    

5.) S ⊃ P               

6.) ~(P ⊃ ~M)

7.) Socrates is a postmodern philosopher (~M) and not the case Socrates is a postmodern philosopher (~M). (3,4, Conjunction) 

REDUCTION AD ABSURDUM: If we accept premises 1 thru 4, then we derived the contradiction in proposition 7 as proof of invalidity. 

7.) (S ⊃ ~M) * ~(S ⊃ ~M)  (3,4, Conjunction)

Ockham’s Razor Shaves All Those Philosophers Who Cannot Shave Themselves.
{(∃x)[Ox * (y)(Py ⊃ Sxy)] * ~Syy}

However, Socrates is not the only philosopher doing his part to undermine Western Civilization; later in history others appeared as biting gadflies against the opinions of the crowd; take for example, the French scholastic theologian, logician, Peter Abelard (1079 –142 A.D.); Scottish Catholic Franciscan priest, friar, professor theology Duns Scotus (1265/66 –1308 ), and English Franciscan friar, theologian William of Ockham (1285-1347 A.D.). 

Peter Abelard was a skillful logician born during the era of Middle Platonism (90 B.C- 300 AD.), and is known as the “Descartes of the 12th century” for his attack on Platonic realism that is the belief universal concepts (words) are actual real things which all existing entities participate. Abelard fiercely opposed this synthesis of Christianity and Platonism by applying his ontological doctrine known as “nominalism,” or “conceptualism” that argues a universal is merely a name (nomen), and not a thing, or object existing objectively in another transcendent world, and to believe so is to erroneously reify abstract concepts; an inherent tendency of language.  Abelard’s critique of reification had little impact at the time, but he still was able to found the first secular university system. He also formulated the legal concept of intent as an element of a criminal act. 

Then again in the 14th century the Franciscan scholar Dun Scotus presented the ontological concept of “univocity of being” which holds being (or beingness) is the property of all real things so that to say “X is a real thing” has one stable meaning so that  “words describing the properties of God mean the same thing as when they apply to people or things.” Unfortunately, this doctrine conflicted with the theological belief that God created all things so now God becomes a being among created beings. According to professor of philosophy and theology, Paul Tyson, author of, “Retuning to Reality,” Cascade Books, (2014), p. 67, Scotus was attempting to create an absolute divide between an infinite God, and finite being to retain God’s absolute transcendence. Tyson traces this evolution of nominalism in the Middle Ages to its dominance in the Enlightenment. 

And yet again the nominalist philosopher Williams of Ockham revisited the problem of universals in the High Middle Ages. Ockham’s metaphysical nominalism involved him in a life and death struggle with Pope John XXII that resulted in him calling the Pope a heretic. Nominalism argues that only individual things exist in reality resulting in an ontological dichotomy of the natural sinful world, and a super-natural transcendent other world. This bi-level ontology creates a separation between the secular world and the sacred (Ibid., p. 54, 74, 141). Tyson notes that this disjointed reality breaks the participatory link between God and all particular created entities--and this happened even before Descartes, Bacon, and Galileo (Ibid., p. 141). Hegel identified this bifocal worldview as displaying a pattern of consciousness formed by two disconnected perceived realities as the “unhappy consciousness (Phenomenology of Spirit, para.197)(pdf.).” 

The critics of postmodernism are trying to distort history giving the false impression that the conflicts between nominalism, relativism, modernism, and Christian theology are somehow wholly unique and new today.

…next:

After-Virtue’s Critique of Metaethical Emotivism