Paradigm Shifting
Of course Dr. Vervaeke’s
lectures can stand on their own and do not need my input as the lecture series
continues. I do not want to sound pretentious even though it is probably
already too late. Also, I do not want to spin the lecture topics either before
being viewed by interested parties; although, some interpretation cannot be
avoided in reviewing the philosophical language in his lectures. I want to
briefly mention some, but not all paradigm shifting concepts that continually
reappear through out the lectures.
Whatever may be “paradigm
shifting” is relative to each person in two ways. First, paradigm shifting
means that new phenomenon appear that was not noticed beforehand in a dominant
paradigm. Alfred Kuhn recounted how seventh and eighteenth French scientists
studying electricity adopted the fluid paradigm to understand the flow of electricity through a circuit. The old model for electricity was based on its
attractive and repulsive effects of differently charged bodies. This new
model of electricity assumed that electricity flowed like water; therefore, it
could be stored like water and from this metaphorical presupposition the
capacitor (leyden jar) was developed.
Secondly, paradigm shifting can also mean that old phenomenon previously not understood take on new meaning. The theory of thermodynamics during natural philosopher Joseph Priestley's time postulated a hypothetical substance (pholgiston: Ancient Greek φλογιστόν, phlŏgistón for "burning up") thought to be present in all things and released as flames during the process of combustion. This theory accounted for the phenomenon of mass loss when
something such as wood was consumed by fire. However, this explanation could
not account for the increase in weight by certain metals after exposure
to heat. Only later did this phenomenon have significance for the scientist who
rejected the pholgistic theory that Priestley could never abandon.
Here
is a more relevant example of paradigm shifting that result in a new
understanding of old phenomenon. The term “psycho-technology” is defined
in lecture Ep. 1
as a systemic use of cognitive tools to achieve insight into the self and the
world. The use of ritual is a disruptive means to get outside the box, or
everyday conceptual framing to alter one’s attention and perspective. Ritual,
meditation, dancing, music, and community assisted altered states of
consciousness can be used as psycho technologies to enhance cognition. At first
glance one is tempted to categorize these customs or rituals as merely
“anthropological” attributes or “mores” of ancient people. But that cultural
categorization may miss a deeper understanding of consciousness and how meaning
is created in human society. And notice that psycho- technology presupposes
consciousness can change in order to align itself with being anew. This
critical idea of consciousness is going to become even more prominent in later
lectures.
During
the decade around 1913 Wittgenstein reviewed Bertrand Russell’s book
co-authored with Alfred Whitehead on logic titled Principia
Mathematica. With Russell’s approval Wittgenstein was to correct
problems with Russellian set theory and work out the rules for categorical
quantifying symbols such as the following:
(∀x)Φx ≡
Everything is
~(∀x)Φx ≡ Nothing is
(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is
~(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is not
Wittgenstein
was having great difficulties with Russellian mathematical logic and his
critical review seemed to stall completely. Without informing Russell,
Wittgenstein decided to be hypnotized to help him develop a system of logic
that avoided uncertainties in Russell’s theoretical effort of basing mathematics
on logic. Can hypnotism be a psycho-technology? While Wittgenstein was
hypnotized Dr. Rogers asked questions about logic that Wittgenstein was unable
to resolve. Dr. Roger put Wittgenstein to sleep after two attempts, but it took
half an hour to wake him. Wittgenstein reported that he felt anesthetized and
paralyzed, but could hear Dr. Roger’s questions. Wittgenstein was later able to
work out a “theory of symbolism” to avoid the problems of Bertrand Russell’s
theory of types. Although some Wittgenstein biographers comment offhandedly
that the hypnotism session was not useful without further elaboration. I view
this as an example of phenomenon left un-interpreted simply because hypnosis
and logic appear to be incompatible concepts. In fact, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus
Logico-Philosophicus (1921) is viewed in the West as a work
primarily on Logic and theory of language, but in Austria-Hungarian Viennese
intellectual circles the Tractatus was interpreted as a philosophical
work on ethics. Some Vienna Circle Logical Positivists actually told students
to ignore section seven of the Tractatus all together because of its
reference to mysticism. The Viennese would put the Tractatus somewhere
in the same category as Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents written
in 1929 and first published in German in 1930.
Is
there a real division between Logic and Ethics, or are they different aspects
of a deeper understanding of Reason?
The youngest of Wittgenstein’s three sisters, Margarete, was brighter
than her youngest brother Ludwig who was considered the dullest of the family. Margarete was attuned to Austrian
intellectual culture and gave her brother some of Kierkegaard’s writings. For
Kierkegaard the essence of Christianity is subjectivity, or as he wrote, “Truth
is subjectivity.”
“The objective accent falls on WHAT is said, the
subjective accent on HOW it is said.”—Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific
Postscript, 1848, Princeton ed., p. 181.
Truth
in ethics, and religion is defined by subjective intention. In one New
Testament parable the Widower only gives a mite to the temple, while the rich
man gives a greater amount, but it is less of a sacrifice for him, and thus has
less spiritual significance. However, in the arena of epistemology Wittgenstein
strangely used the same language, “3.221 … A proposition can only say how a
thing is, not what it is.” For Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein
only in subjectivity is there decisiveness. For objective reflection the truth
is an object. For subjective reflection truth is “appropriation,” of
“participation in,” and “inwardness”(ibid., 171). Wittgenstein
thought Russell and Frege’s focus on logic completely misunderstood the Tractatus
and considered withdrawing it from publication. For Wittgenstein he interpreted
his own work as about the ethical:
“My
work consists of two parts, the one presented here plus all that I
have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the
important point. For the ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside, as it
were, by my book; … I’ve managed in my book to put everything firmly into place
by being silent about it …. For now I would recommend you to read the preface and
the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the
point” (ProtoTractatus,
p.16).
Anagoge
I do not remember ever
studying the Greek word, Anagoge,
which over time came to mean, " ‘reasoning upwards’ (sursum ductio),
when, from the visible, the invisible action is disclosed
or revealed.[3]” However, the literal meaning of anagoge (ἀναγωγή)
is “lifting up of the soul” or “leading up,” but also “fullness
of being.” Anagoga is the root word in “andragogy”
referencing the methods for teaching adults, and “pedagogy” references teaching
children or the young. “Hegemon” means “leader.” And “anarchy” means “no
leader.” So Dr. Henry Giroux’s favorite term “critical pedagogy” is from
“anagoge,” or to lift up the soul of the young. Wonderful!
One thing about
studying philosophy; every so often one experiences a paradigm shift and then
you must go back and re-see everything all over again.
This word study is fun
and a good way to memorize them so let me find some more.
“6.44 Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.”
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