Saturday, June 8, 2019


Paradigm Shifting

Of course Dr. Vervaeke’s lectures can stand on their own and do not need my input as the lecture series continues. I do not want to sound pretentious even though it is probably already too late. Also, I do not want to spin the lecture topics either before being viewed by interested parties; although, some interpretation cannot be avoided in reviewing the philosophical language in his lectures. I want to briefly mention some, but not all paradigm shifting concepts that continually reappear through out the lectures.

Whatever may be “paradigm shifting” is relative to each person in two ways. First, paradigm shifting means that new phenomenon appear that was not noticed beforehand in a dominant paradigm. Alfred Kuhn recounted how seventh and eighteenth French scientists studying electricity adopted the fluid paradigm to understand the flow of electricity through a circuit. The old model for electricity was based on its attractive and repulsive effects of differently charged bodies. This new model of electricity assumed that electricity flowed like water; therefore, it could be stored like water and from this metaphorical presupposition the capacitor (leyden jar) was developed.

Secondly, paradigm shifting can also mean that old phenomenon previously not understood take on new meaning. The theory of thermodynamics during natural philosopher Joseph Priestley's time postulated a hypothetical substance (pholgiston: Ancient Greek φλογιστόν, phlŏgistón for "burning up") thought to be present in all things and released as flames during the process of combustion. This theory accounted for the phenomenon of mass loss when something such as wood was consumed by fire. However, this explanation could not account for the increase in weight by certain metals after exposure to heat. Only later did this phenomenon have significance for the scientist who rejected the pholgistic theory that Priestley could never abandon.

Here is a more relevant example of paradigm shifting that result in a new understanding of old phenomenon. The term “psycho-technology” is defined in lecture Ep. 1 as a systemic use of cognitive tools to achieve insight into the self and the world. The use of ritual is a disruptive means to get outside the box, or everyday conceptual framing to alter one’s attention and perspective. Ritual, meditation, dancing, music, and community assisted altered states of consciousness can be used as psycho technologies to enhance cognition. At first glance one is tempted to categorize these customs or rituals as merely “anthropological” attributes or “mores” of ancient people. But that cultural categorization may miss a deeper understanding of consciousness and how meaning is created in human society. And notice that psycho- technology presupposes consciousness can change in order to align itself with being anew. This critical idea of consciousness is going to become even more prominent in later lectures.

During the decade around 1913 Wittgenstein reviewed Bertrand Russell’s book co-authored with Alfred Whitehead on logic titled Principia Mathematica. With Russell’s approval Wittgenstein was to correct problems with Russellian set theory and work out the rules for categorical quantifying symbols such as the following:

(∀x)Φx ≡ Everything is
~(∀x)Φx ≡ Nothing is
(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is
~(∃x)Φx ≡ Something is not
  
Wittgenstein was having great difficulties with Russellian mathematical logic and his critical review seemed to stall completely. Without informing Russell, Wittgenstein decided to be hypnotized to help him develop a system of logic that avoided uncertainties in Russell’s theoretical effort of basing mathematics on logic. Can hypnotism be a psycho-technology? While Wittgenstein was hypnotized Dr. Rogers asked questions about logic that Wittgenstein was unable to resolve. Dr. Roger put Wittgenstein to sleep after two attempts, but it took half an hour to wake him. Wittgenstein reported that he felt anesthetized and paralyzed, but could hear Dr. Roger’s questions. Wittgenstein was later able to work out a “theory of symbolism” to avoid the problems of Bertrand Russell’s theory of types. Although some Wittgenstein biographers comment offhandedly that the hypnotism session was not useful without further elaboration. I view this as an example of phenomenon left un-interpreted simply because hypnosis and logic appear to be incompatible concepts. In fact, Wittgenstein’s Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus (1921) is viewed in the West as a work primarily on Logic and theory of language, but in Austria-Hungarian Viennese intellectual circles the Tractatus was interpreted as a philosophical work on ethics. Some Vienna Circle Logical Positivists actually told students to ignore section seven of the Tractatus all together because of its reference to mysticism. The Viennese would put the Tractatus somewhere in the same category as Sigmund Freud’s Civilization and Its Discontents written in 1929 and first published in German in 1930. 

Is there a real division between Logic and Ethics, or are they different aspects of a deeper understanding of Reason?  The youngest of Wittgenstein’s three sisters, Margarete, was brighter than her youngest brother Ludwig who was considered the dullest of the family.  Margarete was attuned to Austrian intellectual culture and gave her brother some of Kierkegaard’s writings. For Kierkegaard the essence of Christianity is subjectivity, or as he wrote, “Truth is subjectivity.”

“The objective accent falls on WHAT is said, the subjective accent on HOW it is said.”—Kierkegaard, Concluding Unscientific Postscript, 1848, Princeton ed., p. 181.

Truth in ethics, and religion is defined by subjective intention. In one New Testament parable the Widower only gives a mite to the temple, while the rich man gives a greater amount, but it is less of a sacrifice for him, and thus has less spiritual significance. However, in the arena of epistemology Wittgenstein strangely used the same language, “3.221 … A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is.” For Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein only in subjectivity is there decisiveness. For objective reflection the truth is an object. For subjective reflection truth is “appropriation,” of “participation in,” and “inwardness”(ibid., 171). Wittgenstein thought Russell and Frege’s focus on logic completely misunderstood the Tractatus and considered withdrawing it from publication. For Wittgenstein he interpreted his own work as about the ethical:

“My work consists of two parts, the one presented here plus all that I have not written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important point. For the ethical gets its limit drawn from the inside, as it were, by my book; … I’ve managed in my book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it …. For now I would recommend you to read the preface and the conclusion, because they contain the most direct expression of the point” (ProtoTractatus, p.16).

Anagoge

I do not remember ever studying the Greek word, Anagoge, which over time came to mean, " ‘reasoning upwards’ (sursum ductio), when, from the visible, the invisible action is disclosed or revealed.[3]” However, the literal meaning of anagoge (ἀναγωγή) is “lifting up of the soul” or “leading up,” but also “fullness of being.” Anagoga is the root word in “andragogy” referencing the methods for teaching adults, and “pedagogy” references teaching children or the young. “Hegemon” means “leader.” And “anarchy” means “no leader.” So Dr. Henry Giroux’s favorite term “critical pedagogy” is from “anagoge,” or to lift up the soul of the young. Wonderful!

One thing about studying philosophy; every so often one experiences a paradigm shift and then you must go back and re-see everything all over again.

This word study is fun and a good way to memorize them so let me find some more.
  
“6.44 Not how the world is, is the mystical, but that it is.”


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