The Machine Paradigm of Nature and Human Disenchantment

“3.221 Objects I can only name. Signs represent them. I can only speak of them. I cannot assert them. A proposition can only say how a thing is, not what it is.” –Ludwig Wittgenstein

(∀x)[Px ⊃ (Hx * ~Wx)]

“All Propositions can only say how a thing is, not what it is.”

 At this seemingly odd place I what to bring Wittgenstein into the discussion since his views on the limits of symbolic logic is not unlike Newton’s view of the incoherent machine paradigm of nature and its inability to explain the absurd phenomena of interaction at a distance such as the non-physical interaction of gravity, or magnetic repulsion and attraction. Newton names these phenomena mysteries while Wittgenstein names them mysticism by putting them beyond human understanding. Both philosophers are dealing with what Adorno referred to as the Kantian Block—the very edge of intelligibility and un-intelligibility of experience. The question of whether nature is only a machine has grave consequences for human beings. How can there be values, free will, and moral agency in a wholly deterministic mechanical world? American sociologist Robert Merton made the very important distinction between “the intended, conscious functions of ideas, and the unintended, unconscious ones” (SCR., p. 11). Karl Mannheim warns us that “…in modern times much more depends on the correct thinking through of a situation than was the case in earlier societies”(Ideology and Utopia, 1936). The materialist’s tautology is “Everything is physical; therefore, everything is a machine since everything is physical,” Ad Infinitum. Ignoring fundamental philosophical questions of ethics and epistemology can lead to absolute skepticism, nihilism, narcissistic solipsism, fascism, militarism, apathetic individualism, dehumanization, and disenchantment. When we define the world, we define ourselves.

In his lecture, Professor Noam Chomsky recounts Descartes anchoring modern science on the understanding of the world, nature, or the cosmos as an intelligible physical machine. An animal squealing in pain and a squeaking rusty wheel are ontologically on the same plain—the physical. Isaac Newton comes to the absurd conclusion that there are no machines--nothing works by machine principles. Chomsky points out that we really do not know what “physical” really is—it’s like saying the physical is “really, really real.” The meaning of physical amounts to “Anything we understand.” We do not have a theory of the material or the physical. Atoms are units of measurement. There are no material bodies and cannot be accounted for by mechanical principles. Since Newton, modern science attempts to achieve the lesser goal of developing intelligible theories about the cosmos and not the thing-in-itself.

The Machine Paradigm of Nature could be simply translated into the categorical propositional form “Everything is a Machine,” (∀x)Mx. Sometimes such translations are more radical and linguistically awkward. Let the following categorical proposition express a derived argument of the mechanical thesis of nature as “If all of Nature is a Machine, and all Humans are of nature, then humans are machines.” This proposition can be presented as a two premised argument and a conclusion. Here are the reasons I am presenting this argument in symbolic form: 1.) Show how the Machine Paradigm thesis symbolically appears in a logical argument. I must construct a thesis in order to present an antithesis. 2.) Show how translating an argument into logical notation is diagnostic in itself. 3.) Explain why logical contradictions are a bad thing in an argument. 4.) Follow the logical rule named, “Use it, or lose it,” or practice otherwise one’s reasoning ability will erode.

This form of logical reasoning is called “categorical propositional logic,” or sometimes just “baby logic.”

Definitions:

(∀x) = for all x

(∃x) = for some x

v = either, or, inclusive

⊃ = Logical operator for implication: If, then.

* = and, conjunction

~ = Not

N = Nature

M = Machine

H = Human

x = any item

y = as an ‘unknown’ and not a constant

∴ = Therefore; conclusion.

1.) (∀x)(Nx ⊃ Mx)

“All Nature is a machine”

2.) (∀x)(Hx ⊃ Nx)    /∴  (∀x) (Hx ⊃ Mx)

“All Humans are of Nature”  /∴ “All Humans are machines” 

3.) Ny ⊃ My

1, UI to strip away the quantifiers to show sentence form.

4.) Hy ⊃ Ny

2, UI, sentence form

5.) Hy ⊃ My

3,4 Hypothetical Syllogism

6.) (∀x) (Hx ⊃ Mx)

5, UG to get the conclusion “All Humans are machines.”

Newtonian physics posits, “Nothing works by machine principles:”

7.) (∀x)~Mx

Assumed premise that contradicts premise 1.

8.)~My

7,EI where “y” is an “unknown,” not a constant.

If there is something that is a Human being, then we can derive this contradiction:

9.) (∃x)Hx

10.) Hy

9, EI, where “y” is an “unknown,” not a constant.

11.) ~Hy

5, 8, Modus Tollens

12.) Hy * ~Hy

10, 11, Conjunction.

/∴  (∃y)(Hy *~Hy)

12, EG, Indirect proof reductio ad absurdum resulting from injecting premise 7.

Contradictions are bad because they allow any conclusion whatsoever to be derived:

Definitions:

Ay = Any conclusion whatsoever

1.)Hy * ~Hy

Contradiction

2.) Hy

1, Simplification

3.)Hy v Ay

2, Addition

4.) ~Hy

1, Simplification

5.) Ay

3, 4, Hypothetical Syllogism “Any conclusion whatsoever.”

The symbol (∃x)Hx is deceptively simple. What is human? And what does it mean to say humans are a part of Nature, which is different than saying someone is “natural,” or “unnatural.” These definitions are important for translation, but once the translation is made they are irrelevant to logical symbolism. Translating natural language into symbolic notation frequently reveal argument flaws just from pseudo-propositions that are not really propositions at all, but “nonsense,” or in some cases “senseless.” In fact, this is Wittgenstein’s method of language analysis.

The great promise of Deductive Logic is that if the premises are true (using the sign “T”) in an argument, and the inferences are valid (“consistent”), then the conclusion must be true, or “T.” However, once a contradiction is allowed into an argument, that guarantee of certainty is lost. But what is truth? That is another department down the hall called “Philosophy of Language” and Wittgenstein is working on it…something about “picture” theory, and “language games” that theorizes language is like games—which is to say, “patterns of intention,” and meaning is determined in language by use. The communal tool of language constructs social reality and private experience. In fact, we could replace "T" for "1" and "F" for "0".

  

Wittgenstein on the Limits of Symbolic Logic

“4.441 It is clear that to the complex of the signs “F” and “T” no object (or complex of objects) corresponds; any more than to horizontal and vertical lines or to brackets. There are no “logical objects.”—Ludwig Wittgenstein

~(∀x)Lx

 “Nothing is a logical object.”

Philosopher George Pitcher describes Wittgenstein’s conception as the world of meaningful discourse like a city set in the middle of a jungle: the jungle is defined in terms of that which is not the city. The city is well structured, exact and orderly; everything within the city is visible. Tautologies, contradictions, descriptive propositions—all these occupy the world of meaning, although, the first two say nothing. The jungle, on the other hand, is all that cannot be said, the mystical, the metaphysical, religion, ethics, and art have their place outside the city. But again, this is not the end of the matter. Wittgenstein writes—one could say he reveals his attraction for the mystical, “What can be shown cannot be said,”(Tractatus, 4.1212), and “There are, indeed, things that cannot be put into words. They make themselves manifest. They are what is mystical”(Tractatus 6.522). What manifests itself? Ethical propositions, theological discourse, and surprisingly, logic itself are all placed in the same transcendental realm, which is to say in today's world, the "metaphysical doghouse." “Logic is transcendental” (Tractatus,6.13).

Logic only deals with abstract relationships. If I say “Everybody is related to somebody” (∀x)(∀y)Rxy, the relation is between (x) and (y) not “x” to “R.”

Wittgenstein writes in the Tractatus, “3.1432 We must not say, “The complex sign ‘aRb’ says ‘a stands in relation R to b’”; but we must say, “That ‘a’ stands in a certain relation to ‘b’ says that aRb”.

There is no logical object that is “R.” Relationship is “psychic continuity” (Nature ≡ Machine) and not an object. He is warning against the reification of symbols that represent relationships. Logical objects are idolatrous.

In my thinking, “psychic continuity” is also the answer to the problem of contingent identity statements (A = B), and Saul Kripke’s argument for necessity of self-identity (A = A). Kripke’s argument for the necessity of self-identity makes contingent identity statements impossible; yet, we know there is contingent identity. Identity is not an object which is why the question is not decidable in symbolic logic. But then…that would mean ‘A = B’ would be the foundation of logic, and not ‘A = not non-A’. This principle of logical relationship can be expressed symbolically:

(∀x)(∀y) [(x ≡ y) ⊃ (Fx ⊃ Fy)]

(Given any x)(Given any y)[ If (x is equivalent to y), then (if x is F, then y is F)] 

Like Newton, we can only say how a thing is, not what it is. When a paradigmatic system becomes more real than what it interprets, we then distort being through self deception and deny ourselves unfiltered experience.

Philosopher David Pears wrote that Wittgenstein,

“...was trying to demonstrate not that logic and mathematics do not rest on a realistic basis, but only that that basis cannot provide any independent support for them...the sources of the necessities of logic and mathematics lie within those areas of discourse in actual linguistic practices, and when those necessities seem to point to some independent backing out side the practices, the pointing is deceptive and the idea that the backing is independent is an illusion” (Ludwig Wittgenstein by David Pears, Penguin,1970, p.145).

Early Wittgensteinian scholars failed to make some important distinctions of how Wittgenstein used the words, “senseless” and “nonsensical” (Wittgenstein’s Conception of Philosophy, by K.T. Fann, 1969, p. 25). Wittgenstein claims we can only make sense by saying those things that are within the limits of language. Those things said about the limits of language are “senseless” (sinnlos). Those things said about that which is beyond the limits of language are “nonsense” (unsinning). Many of the English translations do not differentiate between “sinnlos” and “unsinning” so that both are translated as “senseless” (sinnlos). Such translations could be one reason Wittgenstein is thought of as anti-metaphysical. Philosophy attempts to say those things that are beyond the limits of language and is nonsense, “Most propositions and questions, are not false, but nonsense (unsinning)”(Tractatus, 4.003). For Wittgenstein contradictions and tautologies are without ”sense,” (sind sinnlos), but not “senseless.” (nicht unsinnig). The symbol for “0” has no “sense,” but is not “senseless” because it is a symbol of Arithmetic (4.4611). 

“5.1361 The events of the future cannot be inferred from those of the present. Superstition is the belief in the causal nexus.”--Wittgenstein

"Riverside" 

Down by the river by the boats 

Where everybody goes to be alone 

Where you won't see any rising sun 

Down to the river we will run 

When by the water we drink to the dregs 

Look at the stones on the river bed 

I can tell from your eyes 

You've never been by the riverside 

Down by the water the river bed 

Somebody calls you somebody says 

"Swim with the current and float away." 

Down by the river everyday 

Oh my God I see how everything is torn in the river deep 

And I don't know why I go the way 

Down by the riverside

When that old river runs past your eyes 

To wash off the dirt on the riverside 

Go to the water so very near 

The river will be your eyes and ears 

I walk to the borders on my own

And fall in the water just like a stone 

Chilled to the marrow in them bones 

Why do I go here all alone 

Down by the riverside