The Critique of a Postmodern Trope continues...
“[Hayek produced] a terrific steam hammer in order to crack a nut—and then he does not crack it.”—Piero Sraffa’s critique of Friedrich von Hayek’s book “Prices and Production,” (1932).
The Fallacy of Equivocation between the terms Doubt and Skepticism
Hicks completely missed the
different types of skepticism. Skepticism can be a methodological
technique to engage in doubt for testing hypotheses, and/or skepticism can be an attitude
of doubt “toward all the beliefs of man, from sense experience to religious creeds”(Tillich,
Dynamics of Faith, p.19, pdf.).
Hicks’ initial look at Kant suggests skepticism in the first methodological
sense, but then the book equivocates to the attitudinal sense of doubt, and then
later creeps over into nihilism. Hicks states, “Kant’s point was deeper,
arguing that in principle any conclusion reached by any of our faculties
must necessarily not be about reality. Any form of cognition because it
must operate a certain way, cannot put us in contact with reality”(Loc: 1130).
And he writes, “Earlier skeptics had their negative conclusions, continued to
conceive of truth as correspondence to reality”(Loc: 1163). So there are
philosophers that are not pure skeptics such as Descartes. But yet, Hicks
points to Kant as the archetypal skeptic. Kant is not the lone skeptical
“all-destroyer”(Loc: 1157).
Kant understood his
transcendental criticism of speculative metaphysics as necessary to avoid
falling into harmful dogmatic philosophies motivated by mere philodoxy,
or in Greek ϕιλόδοξος (ϕιλό-love; δοξος- belief), meaning love of belief,
or opinion. Kant argues a critical philosophy is needed to avoid dogmatism.
”It is only by criticism that metaphysicians (and, as such, theologians too) can be saved from these controversies and from the consequent perversion of their doctrines. Criticism alone can strike a blow at the root of materialism, fatalism, atheism, free-thinking, fanaticism, and superstition, which are universally injurious—as well as of idealism and skepticism, which are dangerous to the schools, but can scarcely pass over to the public (Critique of Pure Reason, Immanuel Kant, trans., Meiklejohn, 1781, p. 21)(pdf)."
Kant was not a theist in the traditional sense, but
likely a non-theist for his goal in the Critique was to make room for
faith whereas Hume was a faithless atheist because natural-scientific
positivism forces him there—another difference between Kant and Hume that the
generic term skepticism does not acknowledge. Hicks uses the label of skepticism,
and other labels, in the most generic sense such as relativism.
And yet another Fallacy of
Equivocation is committed with the term relativism which claims all
judgments have no universal validity. Hicks wrote, “Hegelian dialectical reason
also differs from Enlightenment reason by implying a strong relativism, against
the universality of Enlightenment reason”(Loc: 1336). Hegel is
categorized by philosophy as an absolute idealist---not as a relative idealist.
Hegel is best known as the philosopher that affirmed universal reason as the
necessary condition for freedom. A
relative idealist believes there are many interpretations of many different
realities; and like a solipsist, think only their own experiences and thoughts
are real with no objective standard by which to judge any one worldview as more
real than another. Absolute idealists believe in one reality because there is
only one mind. This is another case of equivocation of the concept relativistic
idealism with absolute idealism.
Another version of
relativism is the belief there is no absolute truth since the concept of truth
itself is relative to space and time. The relativist’s flawed argument is the
following: “It was once true that the capital of Brazil was Rio de Janeiro, but
now it is false since the capital of Brazil today is Briazilia. Therefore,
truth is not absolute, but relative to time.” In another example the relativist
might argue, “’The light is above John’ is a true proposition; however,
in a different location Y the proposition is false; therefore, truth is not
absolute, but is relative to space.” The problem with these arguments is the
relationships of space and time are omitted from the propositions themselves. It is true the capital of Brazil in 1960 was Rio de Janeiro, and it will always
be true. And for today’s date, it will always be true that the capital of
Brazil is Briazilia. There is no contradiction here as the relativists claim.
That the light was above John at location X is true regardless of what new
location Y he has moved to later. There are no sane philosophers that hold to
this crude version of relativism--not Kant, Hegel, and certainly not Einstein.
Hicks is confusing this un-sophisticated version of epistemological relativism (Loc: 1088) with relationalism. Relationalism, however, only holds that all elements
of meaning in a given situation refer to other elements of meaning in a reciprocal
historical interrelationship. Relationalism is a term coined by sociologist
Karl Mannheim (Ideology and Utopia, 1936, Harvest books, p. 86).
The Fallacy of Ambiguity between the terms Kantian
Idealism and Berkeleian Idealism
“Can
this be called idealism? It is the very opposite of it!… This doctrine of mine
doesn’t destroy the existence of the thing that appears, as genuine idealism
does; it merely says that we can’t through our senses know the thing as it is
in itself.”—Kant, “Prolegomena to
Any Future Metaphysics,” p.21-22(pdf.).
Kantian Transcendental Idealism is the critical science of the logically necessary conditions for the possibility of experience. The term “transcendental” is used by Kant to mean a priori, or before experience. For example, the pure forms of sensibility are space and time which are necessary a priori conditions to have sense experience (intuition) of any object of knowledge. Berkeleian idealism holds that “to be (exist) is to be perceived.” Kant absolutely did not hold this version of idealism, but instead confirmed the thing-in-itself which cannot itself be perceived (Ibid., p.77). Kant wrote, “the unconditioned does not lie in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition”(Critique, p.15). Hicks’ use of the term idealism to describe Kant is very misleading because he again never goes beyond their generic meaning except to equivocate. Kant wrote (italics in original text):
"...it would be an unpardonable misunderstanding—almost a deliberate one—to say that my doctrine turns all the contents of the world of the senses into pure illusion."--Kant, Prolegomena, p. 22).
Post hoc Explication is Not Refutation
“Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is completely at a loss to find another. He has formed his mind on another’s; but the imitative faculty is not the productive”--Kant in Critique, p. 466.
“Dispute the validity of a definition, and he is completely at a loss to find another. He has formed his mind on another’s; but the imitative faculty is not the productive”--Kant in Critique, p. 466.
The best counter-argument that directly refutes
Hick’s epistemology is the second edition fifteen-paged Preface to Kant’s
Critique of Pure Reason (1782) then compare it with Hick’s chapter on ”Kant
the Turning Point.” You can get a free preview of Hicks’ book online.
Kant’s second edition preface to the Critique is aimed precisely at
critics similar to Hicks who are often referred to by Kant as metaphysical
dogmatists. Kant defined dogmatism as “… the dogmatic procedure of pure
reason without previous criticism of its own powers….”(Critique, p. 22).
These metaphysical dogmatists include the religious thinkers of his day who
were stunned by Kant’s devastating refutation of the traditional proofs of the
existence of a supreme being in the Critique, “Transcendental Logic: Second
Division. Transcendental Dialectic: Introduction. I. Of Transcendental Illusory
Appearance,” ([A:292-294; B:349-350], Ibid., p. 209).
Post hoc explication alone is not a refutation. However,
Hicks refutes himself constantly. He makes a statement and then walks it back
by reciting limited summative statements of Kant’s so called radical
relativistic skepticism distantly scattered throughout the book without
actually integrating them into his assessment of Kant. Throughout the entire
book he makes academically obligatory boilerplate acknowledgements to some of
Kant’s concepts as a post hoc camouflaged repair patch job, but then
jumps out in the open to interject Maoist like anti-Kantian slogans. Bare
assertion is not refutation. Hicks never engages Kant’s arguments, but only gives short-change summaries of Kant’s epistemology. Hicks noted that “Kant did
not take all the steps down to postmodernism, but he did take the decisive one”
(Loc: 1157). But, he then states, “Kant is a landmark…Kant went a step
further and redefined truth on subjective grounds” (Loc: 1157). Kant’s
landmark status is not for being an irrational subjective relativistic skeptic,
but for other important reasons such as defeating all the traditional arguments
for the existence of a supreme deity, and resolving the problem of the
origin of knowledge, which hounded Rationalism and Idealism. Kant wrote to the
religious dogmatists,
“These unavoidable problems of mere pure reason are God, freedom (of will), and immortality. The science which, with all its preliminaries, has for its especial object the solution of these problems is named metaphysics—a science which is at the very outset dogmatical, that is, it confidently takes upon itself the execution of this task without any previous investigation of the ability or inability of reason for such an undertaking”(Critique,[A:3-4; B: 4-8]).
The Fallacy of
Equivocation between the terms Real1 and Reality2
Take for example Kant’s
concept of noumenon and phenomenon, which are the
foundational concepts of Kantian epistemology. Hicks wrote after reviewing
Kant, “Abstracting from the above
quotations yields the following. Metaphysically, postmodernism is
anti-realist, holding that it is impossible to speak meaningfully about an
independently existing reality”(Loc: 526).
"He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a living man."--Kant in Critique, p. 466.
"He has learned this or that philosophy and is merely a plaster cast of a living man."--Kant in Critique, p. 466.
He only mentions the term
noumenal, but doesn’t go into detail of what noumenon means. Kant’s
epistemological dichotomy of appearance and reality is the foundation of
Representational Epistemology: there is mediation between the thing-in-itself,
and the thing as it appears to the observer—a distinction that can be
traced back to Plato’s Allegory of the Cave. The thing-in-itself can
only be known indirectly through appearances (phenomena) as experience, which
is the domain of Reason.
Plato’s Allegory of the Cave
Hick’s refuses to seriously
examine the concept of noumenon that can be traced back to ancient Platonic
epistemology.
For Plato, empirical observation was the
lowest of all states of mind of which there are two: lowest level of knowledge
is opinion Doxia (δόξα) “belief”
as in orthodoxy, and the higher level is scientific knowledge
(ἐπιστήμη,
epistēmē) related etymologically to the “Epistles,” or letters,
for example.
The lowest form of knowledge is opinion
based on empirical image (εἰκών,
icon), and observing biological life (ζωὴ, Zoa, or
'life' as in the word ‘Zoo’).
The higher levels of knowledge include mathematics (μαθηματικά,
method) and the highest level of knowledge is of the Forms (ἀρχή, archetype).
Only in the state of mind of Noesis (νόησις)
meaning “understanding, concept, or notion” is there intelligibility
of the invisible (Forms) as opposed to opinion, and belief based on visible
empirical images.
The allegory of the cave
found in Plato’s Republic (514a–520a) is about epistemological
progress and transformation of human worldviews. Plato has Socrates describe to
Glaucon, the brother of Plato, a story of a group of prisoners within a cave
who are chained to a low wall for their entire lives while only facing the
cave’s opposing wall which has moving shadows projected on it by firelight
burning behind the prisoners. Persons behind and above the prisoners make
sounds and move patterned shaped shadow images across the cave wall. This
shadow-world of (εἰκασία)
or “apprehension by images and shadows” is reality1
for these chained prisoners who even give names to the shadows (see lecture: Dr.
Harrison Kleiner lectures on Plato's Allegory of a Cave).
Socrates imagines what would
happen if a prisoner were released to freely walk out of the cave. Socrates
thought the prisoner may have to be forced away from the shadows of their reality1,
and would even try to kill the man that tried to release them. Reality1
is the reality of the empirical images and shadows (Doxia). Plato is subtly
drawing an analogy to Socrates as the man executed by the Athenian State for
attempting to release its citizens from ignorance. As the freed slave walks out
of the cave, they enter the sunlight. This walk to sunlight could be
interpreted as religious and/or a historical-epistemological journey from mere
Doxia, or belief, to Noesis,(νόησις),
meaning understanding, concept, or notion.
What does the sun
symbolically represent? The sun is “…the domain where truth and reality
shine….”(508d). The cave’s firelight provided the shadow show and is
historically interpreted allegorically as deceptive rhetoric, distorted
politics, and sophistry posing as wisdom. The second light is the noumenal
sunlight of ultimate reality2. Interestingly, Plato described
the human eye as “…the most sunlike of all the instruments of sense”(508b).
However, he also said, “Neither vision itself nor its vehicle, which we call
the eye, is identical with the sun”(508a). Socrates may be implying to himself
there is mediation between the subject and object of knowledge. Plato
seems to have recognized the meaning-bestowing activity of consciousness in
shaping the objects of sense perception. This is typical of Plato to foreshadow
an entire Western philosophical school of thought in one summary sentence. However, Hicks seems to have forgotten about Plato's hierarchy of knowledge when he wrote that Kant's, " ...arguments based
on the relativity and causality of perception, the identity of our sense organs
is taken to be the enemy of awareness of reality”(Loc: 1102).
The cave firelight could
also be interpreted ontologically as Nature itself. For the ancient Greeks, “phusis” (meaning “Nature,”
or “physics”) characterize both Logos (Reason) and
of what-is (all things). Nature gives what-is the
ability to manifest itself, but does not show itself as the activity of
manifesting” (see “Heidegger and the Greeks,” by Dr. Carol J. White, p.127)[Pdf].
We may interpret the Kantian
term phenomenon as the reality1 of the shadows, and noumenon
as reality2 of the thing-in-itself. The shadows are
empirically real1, but they are not reality2. The categories of
reason only apply validly to the shadow play reality1;
however, nothing can be said conditionally, or objectively about the noumenal
reality2 according to Kant: “…the unconditioned does not lie
in things as we know them, or as they are given to us, but in things as they
are in themselves, beyond the range of our cognition”(Critique, p.15). This
heterogeneous division between, “cognition of things as phenomena, and of
things in themselves”(Ibid., p.15) is known as the “Kantian Block.” Plato
believed the forms are within the realm of intelligibility. Hegel’s objection
to Kantian epistemology is that knowledge of the noumenal realm is possible,
but only after human consciousness has traveled up the long suffering road of
historical experience passing through the hierarchies of knowledge to the
complete holistic Notion—or in Hegelian language—to Calvary. The “notion” could
be interpreted to mean paradigm.
Hicks continually
equivocates between the two meanings of reality throughout the book. To remain
consistent Hicks could have written, ”Plato has no concept of objective
reality! He only acknowledges the shadows within the cave!” For both Plato and
Kant there is an epistemological noumenal sun. Hicks conveys an anti-Classical
sense of reason by failing to clearly address the appearance and reality
distinction in Western Representational Epistemology, and specifically Kantian
Transcendental Idealism. Instead, he carefully avoids the noumenon concept, and
endlessly repeats anti-realist anti-Kantian slogans. There are classic
philosophical arguments critical of Kant’s concept of noumenon, but Hicks does
not seem to know any of them.
...to continue with lots more.